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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON TAIWAN: FULFILLING A
CHINESE NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC
SOVEREIGNTY?
Piero Tozzi*
INTRODUCTION
In an 1824 notebook entry on the Celestial Empire, the celebrated
American poet and Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson
remarked:
The closer contemplation we condescend to bestow, the more dis-
gustful is that booby nation. The Chinese Empire enjoys precisely a
Mummy's reputation, that of having preserved to a hair for 3 or
4,000 years the ugliest features in the world.... China, reverend
dullness! hoary ideot!, all she can say at the convocation of nations
must be-"I made the tea."'
While today critics seldom express such benighted sentiments so stri-
dently, echoes of Emerson's condescension have rippled through
Western views of the Chinese tradition in particular and of the East-
ern tradition in general. Western historians have regarded the East as
historically in the thrall of "oriental despotism," 2 against which the
little city-states of Greece must forever reenact the battle of Mara-
thon.3 Such a world view may posit that humanism lacks indigenous
roots in the barren soil of Asia, soil from which humanism's most evi-
* I would like to thank Professor Frank Chiang and Jack Chen for their substan-
tive comments on prior drafts of this Note. I would also like to thank Hsiu-mei Tung
and Jui-hua Chang for their help in translating Chinese language sources.
1. Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China 59 (1984) (quoting Stuart C.
Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the Chinese, 1785-1882
(1969)).
2. Those who have shared this view include Montesquieu, for whom China was a
despotic society where fear held sway. Donald M. Lowe, The Function of "China" in
Marx, Lenin and Mao 1 (1966). For critiques of Western images of the Orient, see
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978) (dealing primarily with Western reactions to the
Islamic "Near East"). For a discussion of China in the eyes of Vestem historians, see
Cohen, supra note 1.
3. The Greeks fought the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. against the Persian ar-
mies of Darius. The theme of the Greeks struggling to maintain freedom from East-
ern despotism runs throughout Herodotus's The Persian Wars, illustrated in the
following passage:
[A] Persian is about to throw a bridge over the Hellespont, and bringing
with him out of Asia all the forces of the East, to carry war into Greece,-
professing indeed that he only seeks to attack Athens, but really bent on
bringing all the Greeks into subjection.... [A]id those who would maintain
the freedom of Greece .... For do not cherish a hope that the Persian, when
he has conquered our country, will be content and not advance against you.
Herodotus, The Persian Wars 559 (George Rawlinson trans., The Modem Library
1942) (n.d.).
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dent political manifestation-democracy-could never spring forth.4
Certain legal commentators, even those well-versed in the Chinese
tradition, likewise claim that China lacks a concept of democratic
sovereignty.
Broad caricatures and well-intentioned generalizations do not ade-
quately describe the Chinese political tradition. While this tradition
unmistakably has roots independent of Western democratic, rights-
emphasizing theories,6 it is hardly bereft of a notion of the people as
ultimately sovereign. In classical Chinese thought, particularly that of
the Confucian theorist Mencius,7 an emperor legitimately wielding the
"Mandate of Heaven" ruled for the benefit of the people; if he ceased
to place their welfare paramount, popular revolt was justified.8
Though this idea contended with the totalitarian theories of the Legal-
ist Han Fei-tzu 9-an alternative tradition running throughout Chinese
history which some argue approximates modern totalitarianism' 0-
4. A cynic would note that the link between democracy and humanism can be
fragile at times. Hitler, after all, assumed the chancellorship of Germany on January
30, 1933, in a perfectly constitutional manner and in the wake of the disarray amongst
the other political parties of Weimar Germany. See William L. Shirer, The Rise and
Fall of the Third Reich 150-87 (1959). Thracymachus, in Plato's Republic, also main-
tains that democracies are as capable of making despotic laws as autocracies are.
Plato, The Republic of Plato 18 (Francis M. Comford ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1941) (n.d.). Cf. The Federalist No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that "a pure democracy.., can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of
faction").
5. See, e.g., Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 15, 61 (1993) (stating that "[i]n traditional China, people had no
idea of 'democracy' or 'popular sovereignty' "and that the "[e]mperor with the divine
right was the master of the people"). Such statements paint with too broad a brush.
See discussion infra part I.B.
6. Representative of liberal, individual rights-emphasizing views are those held
by modern theorists such as Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously at xi (1977) (defining individual rights as "political trumps held by
individuals" capable of checking actions taken by the political community at large).
Others posit that the Western democratic tradition is much less individualistic and
more communitarian than the late twentieth-century world view of the American
Civil Liberties Union would have it. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The
Impoverishment of Political Discourse at x (1991) (stating that current American
rights talk is marked by "its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with
respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities"); see also Barry A. Shain,
The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political
Thought (1994) (arguing that a reformed Protestant communalism that eschewed in-
dividualism formed the basis of the American nation's founding political concepts).
7. Mencius (D.C. Lau, trans., Penguin Books 1970) (n.d.).
8. See discussion infra part I.B.
9. The most important of his writings are collected in Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writ-
ings (Wm. Theodore de Bary ed. & Burton Watson trans., Columbia Univ. Press
1964) (n.d.).
10. See, e.g., Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China at ix
(Doubleday Anchor Books 1956) (1939) (stating that Legalism "as expounded by
Han Fei Tzu, finds so close a parallel in modern Totalitarianism that the reader, so far
from being puzzled by anything remote or unfamiliar, will wonder whether these pre-
tended extracts from a book of the third century B.C. are not ... cuttings from a
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Mencius's persistent presence in Chinese theories of the state should
dispel any notions that the Chinese political tradition lacked any ref-
erence to popular sovereignty."
While this humanistic Confucian vein was often submerged
throughout China's dynastic history, the ideals of Sun Yat-sen's12 Re-
publican Revolution of 191113 drew heavily on indigenous precursors.
Sun's Three Principles of the People (Nationalism, Democracy, and
"People's Livelihood") attempted to splice Western republicanism
and Lincolnian rhetoric 4 with the Chinese tradition.15 Sun's theories
of government found expression in the 1947 Constitution 6 of the Re-
public of China ("ROC"), 7 which was for the most part suspended
prior to the Communist victory of 1949 and the ensuing relegation of
the government of the ROC to offshore exile on Taiwan.18 From this
current newspaper"); see also Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China
18 (1967) (calling the Legalists "genuine totalitarians"). Such a view might posit that
Maoism has its origins in the Chinese classical tradition as well, albeit one very differ-
ent from Confucian humanism.
11. One long-time commentator on Taiwan's democratic evolution, John F. Cop-
per, refers to the classical political tradition as "certainly not an undemocratic tradi-
tion." John F. Copper with George P. Chen, Taiwan's Elections: Political
Development and Democratization in the Republic of China 8 (1984).
12. Born in 1866 in the fishing village of Ts'ui-heng in Kwangtung province, Sun's
given name was Wen. Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese
Revolution 10 (1970). "Yat-sen" is the transliteration from the Cantonese dialect of
the name he adopted following his baptism in 1884. 1l at 16.
Most Chinese historical names mentioned in this Note will be given in the Chinese
order, with last name preceding the given (e.g., Mao Tse-tung, not Tse-tung Mao).
Furthermore, the romanizations used in this Note for Chinese names and terms will
usually follow the archaic Wade-Giles system, as it is the phonetic system used in most
of the sources consulted. Names of authors, however, will appear as they are
published.
13. See infra part I.B.
14. Compare Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu L The Three Principles of the People 52
(Frank W. Price trans., n.d.) (remarking that "government is a thing of the people and
by the people") with Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in
Living American Documents 186, 187 (Isidore Starr et al. eds., 1971) ("ITihat govern-
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the
earth."); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,403 (1819) ("The govern-
ment proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of
the people....").
15. One biographer of Sun has written that "His dominant ideas were derived
from Western political thought, particularly the theories of republicanism and social-
ism, but they were definitely colored by ethical Confucianism." C. Martin Wilbur, Sun
Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot 7 (1976). This Note seeks to draw attention to the Con-
fucian roots of Sun's concept of democracy.
16. Although the National Assembly adopted this constitution on December 25,
1946, because it did not go into effect until December 25 of the following year, it will
be referred to as the 1947 Constitution.
17. ROC Const. ch. I, art. 1 ("The Republic of China, founded on the Three Prin-
ciples of the People, shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by
the people, and for the people.").
18. The use of the preposition "on," rather than "in," when referring to Taiwan is
intentional, because neither the international community nor the governments on Tai-
wan and in mainland China regard the island as an independent entity, which use of
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island redoubt Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang
party ruled supreme for decades, backed by martial law, and the Re-
public's constitution stagnated from disuse.19
Not until July 15, 1987, when Chiang Ching-kuo, son of the Gener-
alissimo, lifted martial law, did the 1947 Constitution truly begin to
realize its promise.20 Since then, the government of Taiwan has em-
barked on a program of widespread electoral liberalization and consti-
tutionalist revival, culminating in constitutional amendments effecting
direct popular sovereignty, most notably a 1994 provision permitting
direct popular election of the president and vice president by 1996.21
the word "in" would imply. Both the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's
Republic of China on the mainland traditionally have claimed to be the legitimate
government of all China. Commentary in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States clarifies that: "[A]n entity is not a state if it does not
claim to be a state. For example, Taiwan might satisfy the elements of the definition
in this section, but its authorities have not claimed it to be a state, but rather part of
the state of China." Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 201 cmt. f (1987).
Government officials from Taiwan often refer to "the Republic of China on Tai-
wan." See, e.g., Lien Chan, The Republic of China on Taiwan Belongs in the United
Nations, Orbis, Fall 1993, at 633 (stating the case for United Nations recognition).
The ostensible reason for this appellation is to help foreigners differentiate between
the government on Taiwan and the government of the People's Republic of China on
the mainland. Huang Wen-ling, ROC's Name to Stay the Same: Hu, China News, Oct.
12, 1995, at 1. Mainland officials remain leery of linguistic nuances that may imply
that there is an independent state of Taiwan. See Qian Qichen, Speech at a Luncheon
at the U.S. Foreign Policy Association (Sept. 29, 1995), in PR Newswire, Sept. 29,
1995, available in WESTLAW, Wires (speaking in his capacity as Vice Premier and
Foreign Minister of mainland China). Opposition politicians on Taiwan who are
members of the Democratic Progressive Party are inclined toward Taiwan's indepen-
dence, and hence are likely to favor use of the word "in." See infra note 244.
The author of this Note does not want to get embroiled in intractable political dis-
putes over names. Much of this Note addresses the constitutional history of the Re-
public of China while it governed the mainland, making use of the word "Taiwan" to
identify the government at that time incongruous. The constitution will be identified
as that of the Republic of China throughout. When referring to post-1949 develop-
ments, "Taiwan" will sometimes be used to refer to this offshore political entity, while
elsewhere, "Republic of China" better lends itself to the narrative. See also discussion
infra part III.B (exploring the issue of Taiwan's identity in greater detail).
19. See infra notes 242-58 and accompanying text. The Kuomintang is commonly
referred to by the initials KMT; througout this Note, both terms will be used
interchangeably.
20. Some have suggested that the thawing began in the 1970s. See, e.g., Hung-mao
Tien, Taiwan's Evolution Toward Democracy: A Historical Perspective, in Taiwan:
Beyond the Economic Miracle 3, 9 (Denis F. Simon & Michael Y. M. Kau eds., 1992)
(stating that significant political change began in the 1970s with the recruitment of
native Taiwanese by then Vice President Chiang Ching-kuo into positions of real sig-
nificance within the Kuomintang). Also significant was the ruling party's toleration of
the formation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1986.
See id at 10.
21. This provision reads: "The President and Vice President shall be directly
elected by the entire populace of the free area of the Republic of China. This shall be
effective from the election for the ninth-term President and Vice President in 1996."
ROC Const. art. 2, as amended Aug. 1, 1994.
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A National Affairs Conference convened by President Lee Teng-hui
in July 1990, partially in response to student demonstrations for
greater political liberalization and constitutional reform,' was partic-
ularly important in speeding the reform process.
This Note examines the democratization and constitutional reform
on Taiwan during the past decade in light of the Chinese political tra-
dition, and considers whether the reform fulfills an indigenous, antici-
pative Chinese notion of democratic sovereignty. Part I revisits
classical Chinese thought, contrasting the Confucian tradition exem-
plified by Mencius with its Legalist counterpart, as they are the two
traditions most relevant to a discussion of modem-day democracy and
autocracy. Part II examines the revolutionary ideology of Sun Yat-sen
and the reasons for the stillbirth of its democratic ideals. Part LI ex-
plores the republican revival of the late 1980s and the 1990s on Taiwan
as well as hurdles confronting the emergence of truly democratic gov-
ernment. Finally, part IV discusses the significance of the develop-
ment of a Chinese notion of democratic sovereignty for the Chinese
people and for Western observers who view the Chinese political tra-
dition as completely lacking a concept of democratic sovereignty. This
Note concludes that the democratic and constitutional evolution on
Taiwan, though novel for the Chinese and the non-Western world and
brought about in large part due to interaction with the West, is signifi-
cant because it revives and fulfills a latent, indigenous tradition of
popular sovereignty.3
To preclude confusion over terminology, it should be noted at the
onset that the Chinese notion of democratic sovereignty, certainly in
the classical thought of Mencius but also at present, is much less indi-
vidualistic and more group-oriented than modem, rights-emphasizing
Western theories.24 Citations throughout this Note to works in the
For an overview of Taiwan's ongoing democratization efforts, see Ross A. Snel &
Piero Tozzi, Nurturing Democracy: Taiwan Goes to the Polls, The New Leader, Oct.
10-24, 1994, at 9, 9-11. See generally Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan(1992) (providing a systematic, technical analysis of Taiwan's political and socioeco-
nomic transformation).
22. Taiwan President Lee Agrees to Meet Student Protestors, Reuter News Service,
Mar. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE File.
23. Thus answering rhetorical questions of concern to the editors of a certain illus-
trious Gotham gazette, viz. "Why does democracy-to this day-.face such an uphill
struggle in non-Christian, non-Western societies? ... Are non-Western civilizations
ever going to become democratic?" World History: A Non-P.C. Version, N.Y. Post,
Nov. 28, 1994, at 24.
24. Although present developments on Taiwan are unmistakably democratic, a
less-liberal modem political system based in part on Confucian communitarian values
has been advocated by some proponents of a uniquely Asian form of societal govern-
ance, most notably Singapore's authoritarian technocrat, Lee Kuan-yew. See Fareed
Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation With Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Affairs,
MarJApr. 1994, at 109, 113 ("The fundamental difference between Western concepts
of society and government and East Asian concepts ... is that Eastern societies be-
lieve that the individual exists in the context of his family.").
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Western tradition may provide reference points to readers unfamiliar
with the Chinese tradition.25
I. PEOPLE AND EMPEROR IN CLASSICAL CHINESE THOUGHT
The Chinese are rightfully proud of a history which dates back at
least 3500 years26 -or 3 or 4000 years, to borrow Emerson's chronol-
ogy. Without first understanding this tradition, China's twentieth cen-
tury, with its great revolutions and tremendous upheaval, can never be
fully intelligible. History may be punctuated by great turmoil, but it
also operates as a continuum.
A theme running throughout Chinese history is the relationship be-
tween the people and the emperor. In this century, the traditional
dynastic emperor arguably has given way to twentieth-century
strongmen cloaked with modern-day ideologies to justify their posi-
tions of power, like Yuan Shih-k'ai, 27 Chiang Kai-shek, or Mao Tse-
tung. Revolution, be it a change of dynasty or the more radical revo-
lutions of 1911 or 1949, has always been carried out in the name of the
people.28
Revolution is not always about radical change. It also can mark the
coming to fruition of ideas and concepts latent in the consciousness of
25. As Professor William Theodore de Bary pointed out in a preface to papers
presented at a seminal conference held at Columbia University in 1958 on the role of
the Oriental Classics in general education, "[One] should have a good grounding in
Western civilization and thought before attempting what must inevitably be stranger
and more difficult to comprehend in the Oriental traditions.... Confucius and Men-
cius will be all the more meaningful to the man who knows Plato and Aristotle." Wm.
Theodore de Bary, Preface to Approaches to the Oriental Classics at xi-xii (Wm. The-
odore de Bary ed., 1959).
26. The Chinese claim to be descendants of the Yellow Emperor (c. 3500 B.C.),
whose reign is shrouded in the mists of history. While there is archaeological evi-
dence of a primitive culture centered around the Yellow River, Chinese history
proper dates back to the Shang dynasty (c. 1550 B.C.). Oracle-bone inscriptions-
ideographs etched onto scapulae-date back to this era, and form the basis of the
written Chinese language. For a discussion of Chinese pre-history, consult K.C. Wu,
The Chinese Heritage (1982). For a discussion of the etymology and significance of
certain written Chinese characters, see 2 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in
China 218-31 (1956).
27. The bonapartist Yuan Shih-k'a will be discussed infra part II.D. Though a
transitional figure, perhaps having more in common with traditional usurpers of the
imperial throne than with shapers of China's modern history like Chiang or Mao, it is
noteworthy that Yuan favored a constitutional monarchy, thus modifying the tradi-
tional imperial system. For a balanced portrait, see Ernest P. Young, The Presidency
of Yuan Shih-k'ai (1977).
28. While Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Revolution certainly represented a break with tradi-
tions that had become hidebound, this Note will argue that the revolution was much
less radical than some might assume. See infra part II.C. Historians sympathetic to
the Communist revolution would agree, albeit for different reasons. See, e.g., Lucien
Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, at 108 (Muriel Bell trans., 2d
ed. 1971) ("[T]he Kuomintang by no means stood for the total break with the past
represented by the [Chinese Communist Party]: we all know there was only one Chi-
nese Revolution, and that it took place in 1949.").
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a people.29 This part studies ideas formed more than some two thou-
sand years ago. These ideas, nevertheless, remain relevant to any dis-
cussion of an evolving Chinese notion of democratic sovereignty
because they are the first to state clearly the nature of a relationship
which runs throughout Chinese history-that of people and ruler.
A. Basic Principles of Traditional Chinese Thought
Two traditional ideologies are most relevant to a discussion of Chi-
nese political thought-Confucianism, 30 particularly as expressed by
Confucius' disciple Mencius, and Legalism. Confucianism is con-
cerned with the moral cultivation of the individual, who exists not as a
solitary creature, but as family member, friend, and subject-a crea-
ture embedded in a social context.31 According to the Confucians,
five social relations characterize society: emperor and subject, parent
and child, husband and wife, elder sibling and younger sibling, friend
and friend.32 All, save the last, are hierarchical.33 Undergirding all
society is the family; undergirding the familial relationship is the ideal
29. Arguably the American Revolution, for example, was much more evolution-
ary than revolutionary. The year 1776 did not mark a great break with the past, but
rather, another year of great significance in the progression of Anglo-American no-
tions of legitimate government. Other years of significance would include 1215 (the
year England's barons forced King John to sign the Magna Charta at Runnymeade)
and 1688 (the year of Britain's Glorious Revolution). Bernard Bailyn, among others,
has argued that the American Revolution was essentially conservative, viewing the
revolutionary leadership as concerned "not with the need to recast the social order
nor... the injustices of stratified societies but with the need to purify a corrupt
constitution and fight off the apparent growth of prerogative power." Bernard Bailyn,
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 283 (1967). For a contrary view,
consult Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1992).
30. Confucianism originates in the thought of a historical sage known as Master
K'ung (c. 551-479 B.C.), whose name can be transliterated as K'ung Fu-tzu. Jesuit
missionaries in the sixteenth century latinized his name into Confucius. Aside from
Confucius, the only other thinker whose name is known in the Vest by its Latin form
is that of his greatest disciple, Mencius (c. 372-289 B.C.). See Introduction to Matteo
Ricci, S.i., The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven 6 (Edward J. Malatesta, SJ. ed.,
Douglas Lancashire & Peter Hu Kuo-chen, SJ. trans., Ricci Institute 1985) (1603).
For an account of the fascinating intellectual dialogue which took place between Jes-
uit missionaries and Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucian scholars, see John D. Young, Con-
fucianism and Christianity. The First Encounter (1983).
31. Thus Confucian anthropology is "political" in the basic Aristotlean sense of
the word: "[Mian is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis." Aristotle, The
Politics of Aristotle 5 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1981) (n.d.).
For the principles of Confucius's thought, see the text and commentary in 1 Sources of
Chinese Tradition 15-33 (Win. Theodore de Bary et al. eds, Columbia Univ. Press
1960) [hereinafter I Sources]; Confucius, The Analects of Confucius (Arthur Waley
ed. & trans., Vintage Books 1938) (n.d.) [hereinafter Analects]. D.C. Lau sets forth
the principles of Mencius's thought in Introduction to Mencius, supra note 7, at 7-46.
32. Wu, supra note 26, at 75.
33. For a criticism of Confucian patriarchalism, see Teemu Ruskola, Note, Law,
Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing and Communist China, 103 Yale LJ.
2531, 2532-34 (1994).
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of hsiao, or ifial piety.' In the Confucian tradition, in marked con-
trast to the Legalist, loyalty to the family takes precedence over loy-
alty to the state.35
Central to Confucian theory is a moral cosmology based on the
principle of the tao, often translated as "the Way."' 36 The tao is a uni-
versal absolute,37 and is ascertainable through human reason38 as well
34. For primary source material dating to the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) regarding
the proper ordering of familial relations along traditional Confucian principles, con-
sult YUan Ts'ai, Precepts for Social Life (1179) in Family and Property in Sung China(Patricia Buckley Ebrey ed. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984).
35. Ideally there should be no conflict between duties to the family and to the
state, for the family is the basis for the polity. See Analects, supra note 31, bk. II, para.
21, at 93 ("Be filial ... and you will be contributing to government."); see discussion
infra note 46; compare Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics
251 (J.A.K. Thomson ed., 1953) (n.d.) ("The love between husband and wife is evi-
dently a natural feeling, for Nature has made man even more of a pairing than a
political animal in so far as the family is an older and more fundamental thing than
the state. .. .") and Pope Leo XIII, On the Condition of the Working Classes: Rerum
Novarum 13 (N.C.W.C. trans., St. Paul Editions 1942) (1891) ("[T]he family like the
State is ... a society in the strictest sense of the term .... [T]he family assuredly
possesses rights, at least equal with those of civil society .... We say 'at least equal'
because, inasmuch as domestic living together is prior both in thought and in fact to
uniting into a polity, it follows that its rights and duties are also prior and more in
conformity with nature.") with Aristotle, supra note 31, at 1, 6 (arguing that political
society is "the most sovereign of all [goods]" as the whole is greater than its parts).
36. See, e.g., Arthur Waley, Introduction to Analects, supra note 31, at 30-31 (de-
fining tao as "the Way").
37. Taoism-Waley's third way of thought in ancient China, see Waley, supra note
10-has a much more relativistic conception of the tao. Chuang Tzu, a wry Taoist
sage, states: "[Whether you point to a little stalk or a great pillar, a leper or the
beautiful Hsi-shih... the Way makes them all into one.... [The sage] has no use [for
categories], but relegates all to the constant." Chuang Tzu, Basic Writings 36 (Win.
Theodore de Bary ed. & Burton Watson trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1964) (second
alteration in original).
38. The metaphor of the heart (hsin) represents the locus of moral intuition in all
people. Human-heartedness (]en), or a capacity to ascertain what Waley terms the
Good, is what makes rational humans distinct from animals. See Mencius, supra note
7, bk. VI, pt. A, sec. 15, at 168 ("The organ of the heart can think"); id. bk. IV, pt. B,
sec. 19, at 131 ("Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common
man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it."); id. bk. IV, pt.
B, sec. 28, at 133-34 ("A gentleman differs from other men in that he retains his
heart."); see generally D.C. Lau, Introduction to Mencius, supra note 7, at 13-19 (dis-
cussing the significance of hsin); see also Analects, supra note 31, bk. IV, para. 17, at
105 ("In the presence of a good man, think all the time how you may learn to equal
him. In the presence of a bad man, turn your gaze within!"). Cf. Jeremiah 31:33
("[God] ... will... write [His Law] on their hearts."); 2 Corinthians 3:3 (citing the
heart as the locus of God's law).
A profitable comparison of Western notions of natural law with those of the Con-
fucians is possible. See Needham, supra note 26, at 518-83. According to traditional
Thomistic principles, natural law was an expression in nature of God's eternal law,
that law which exists always in the mind of God. Natural law is ascertainable through
reason, though God also makes His law known through revelation of divine law.
Whereas the precepts of eternal law, divine law, and natural law are absolute and
universal, human law, or positive law, is an artifact which is just insofar as it corre-
sponds with natural law, and unjust insofar as it deviates. See St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologica in The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, pt. I-II, q. 91, at 11-
1200 [Vol. 64
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as through fidelity to Ii, or ritual, in accordance with the teachings of
the ancients.3 9 The chiin tzu, or moral gentleman, is obligated to culti-
vate his heart according to the Way's code: "Just as the hundred ap-
prentices must live in workshops to perfect themselves in their craft,
so the gentleman studies, that he may improve himself in the Way."4 0
According to Confucian idealism, moral self-cultivation should ben-
efit all society. The individual possessing moral force or virtue (t6) is
able to lead baser individuals to virtue, thus promoting not only social
harmony,41 but also harmony with the natural world. This theme re-
curs like a leitmotif throughout the proverbs and sayings attributed to
Confucius that are contained in a work called the Analects: "He who
rules by moral force (ti) is like the pole-star, which remains in its
place while all the lesser stars do homage to it."" Contrary to the
Legalist, the Confucian posits: "Govern the people by regulations,
keep order among them by chastisements, and they will flee from you,
and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order
23 (Dino Bigongiari ed., Hafner Press 1953) (1266-1273) [hereinafter Summa Theo-
logica]; see also Cicero, De Legibus 317, 381 (Clinton W. Keyes trans., 1928) (n.d.)
(stating that "Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what
ought to be done and forbids the opposite" and that "Law is the primal and ultimate
mind of God"). In the Chinese construction, tao might be synonymous with eternal
law, though Heaven (tien) is a nonanthropomorphic quasi-deistic concept, and li the
rough equivalent of natural law. Fa, of which the Legalists speak, corresponds to
positive law. No equivalent of divine law exists in this paradigm, for China, unique
among civilizations, contains no idea of a godlike lawgiver. Bodde & Morris, supra
note 10, at 8-11; see also Luke T. Lee & Whalen W. Lai, The Chinese Conception of
Law: Confucian, Legalist and Buddhist, 29 Hastings LU. 1307, 1309 (1978) ("Li is
closely related to tao, the natural order, and this emphasis on moral rules and natural
order is not unlike the emphasis on natural law in the Vest .... ").
39. "Confucians believed that underlying the minutiae of the specific rules of 1i are
... certain broad moral principles which give the Ii their validity because they are
rooted in innate human feeling. .. ." Bodde & Morris, supra note 10, at 19-20. Cf.
Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law 62-63 (Doris C. Anson trans.,
1951) ("Natural law is not a written law.... Natural law is the ensemble of things to
do and not to do... from the simple fact that man is man, nothing else being taken
into account.").
40. Analects, supra note 31, bk. XIX, para. 7, at 225.
41. Consider the following excerpt from The Great Learning, (Ta Hsaeh), one of
the Four Books (The Great Learning The Mean, The Analects, and Mencius) which
comprise the elementary Confucian canon:
Wshing to govern well their states, [the ancients] would first regulate their
families. Wishing to regulate their families, they would first cultivate their
persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they would first rectify their
minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they would first seek sincerity in their
thoughts. Wishing for sincerity in their thoughts, they would first extend
their knowledge.
1 Sources, supra note 31, at 115.
42. Analects, supra note 31, bk. II, para. 1, at 88; see also id. bk. IV, para. 11, at
104 ("Where gentlemen set their hearts upon moral force (t6), the commoners set
theirs upon the soil." (footnotes omitted)).
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among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect and come
to you of their own accord."43
Elitism is very much a part of Confucianism, with its distinctions
between the virtuous and the vulgar. The chfin tzu has an obligation
to teach, particularly by example. All education to the Confucians is
normative. Although differing schools argued over whether human
nature was good or evil-with Mencius the most famous proponent of
the intrinsic goodness of the human heart and HsUn Tzu the propo-
nent of its propensity for evil44-they agreed on the importance of
moral education.
Morality, however, was not something that an emperor could legis-
late by means of fa, or positive law 4 5-a belief that set them apart
from the Legalists. Though the Legalists did not believe in morality,
they most certainly believed that the law could be an instrument for
controlling behavior. Legalism sought to induce utter fealty to the
emperor through behavioristic application of rewards and punish-
ments manifested in a systematic penal code. Two western scholars of
imperial China, Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, describe the Legal-
ists as follows:
43. Id. bk. II, para. 3, at 88 (footnote omitted).
44. D.C. Lau, Introduction to Mencius, supra note 7, at 12-37 (providing an excel-
lent discussion of debates on human nature among competing schools of thought in
ancient China). Mencius begins with the supposition that human beings are good by
nature, though people can easily lose this goodness. Mencius, supra note 7, bk. II, pt.
A, sec. 6, at 82 ("No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the sufferings of others.");
see supra note 38; cf Hstin Tzu, Basic Writings 157 (Win. Theodore de Bary ed. &
Burton Watson trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1963) ("Man's nature is evil; goodness is
the result of conscious activity."). Interestingly, Hstln Tzu was the teacher of Han
Fei-tzu, who took his master's teachings in an entirely different direction. See Burton
Watson, Introduction to Han Fei Tzu, supra note 9, at 10-11.
45. Note the following remonstrance by a scholar named Shu-hsiang against the
first codes of positive legislation, initially inscribed in 536 B.C.:
Originally, sir, I had hope in you, but now that is all over. Anciently, the
early kings... did not put their punishments and penalties [into writing], ...[T]hey used the principle of social rightness (yi) to keep the people in
bounds .... activated for them the accepted ways of behavior (i), main-
tained good faith (hsin) toward them, and presented them with [examples
of] benevolence (len) ....
But when the people know what the penalties are, they . . acquire a
contentiousness which causes them to make their appeal to the written
words [of the penal laws] ..... As soon as the people know the grounds on
which to conduct disputation, they will reject the [unwritten] accepted ways
of behavior (ii) and make their appeal to the written word .... Disorderly
litigations will multiply and bribery will become current.... I have heard it
said that a state which is about to perish is sure to have many governmental
regulations.
Bodde & Morris, supra note 10, at 16-17 (noting that the letter, strongly Confucian in
tone, was written when Confucius was a teenager, and thus that such ideas were not
complete innovations of the Great Sage) (alterations in the original). Cf. Tacitus, The
Complete Works of Tacitus 117 (Moses Hadas ed. & Alfred J. Church & William J.
Brodribb trans., The Modem Library 1942) (n.d.) (remarking that a superabundance
of laws is a sign of a civilization in decay).
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Their aim was direct and simple: to create a political and military
apparatus powerful enough to suppress feudal privilege at home,
expand the state's territories abroad, and eventually weld all the ri-
val kingdoms into a single empire.... Their insistence on law...
was motivated by no concern for "human rights," but simply by the
realization that law was essential for effectively controlling the
growing populations under their jurisdiction. In thinking and tech-
niques they were genuine totalitarians, concerned with men in the
mass, in contrast to the Confucians, for whom individual, family, or
local community were of paramount importance.
Han Fei-tzu provides an example of the draconian sadism the ruler
should mete out for trifling violations of the Legalist's law:
Once in the past Marquis Chao of Han got drunk and fell asleep.
The keeper of the royal hat, seeing that the marquis was cold, laid a
robe over him.... [After the marquis awoke he] punished the
keeper of the robe for failing to do his duty, and the keeper of the
hat for overstepping his office....
Hence an enlightened ruler, in handling his ministers, does not
permit them to gain merit by overstepping their offices, or to speak
words that do not tally with their actions. Those who overstep their
offices are condemned to die; those whose words and actions do not
tally are punished.47
The ideal Legalist emperor must act the martinet, his every directive
unquestionably obeyed, for if he were "lenient and fond of sparing
lives, his subordinates [would] impose upon his kind nature. If supe-
rior and inferior try to change roles, the state will never be ordered."4 s
46. Bodde & Morris, supra note 10, at 18.
The contrast between the Confucian and Legalist views toward the family and the
state are best illustrated in the story of a man known to posterity as Honest Kung, of
whom both Confucius and the great Legalist theoretician Han Fei-tzu write. Kung
was so nicknamed for his extreme scrupulosity: He was punctilious to the point of
turning in his father to the authorities for having stolen a sheep. Han Fei-tzu consid-
ered him a man to be emulated, whereas to the Confucians he was the worst sort of
viper, for he struck at the bond of father and son, which is the most basic of social
relations. Han Fei Tzu, supra note 9, at 105-07; see Analects, supra note 31, bk. XIII,
para. 18, at 175-76. Similarly in the Western canon, Dante places Brutus, along with
Cassius and Judas, in the mouth of Dis (Lucifer), his head to be gnawed upon for all
eternity in the deepest circle of Inferno. Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of
Dante Alighieri: Inferno, Canto XXXIV, Versi 61-69, at 313 (Allen Mandelbaum
trans., Bantam Books 1980) (c. 1321). While Brutus may have been motivated by love
for the fallen Roman Republic, extinguished by Julius Caesar's autocratic lust Dante
considers him among the most contemptible of men for betraying his benefactor, who
had been like a father to him.
In modem times, certain excesses during Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution
(1966-76), in particular the encouraged denunciation of family members as "counter-
revolutionaries" or other class enemies, call to mind the perverse priorities of the
Legalists. See, e.g., Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai 285 (1986) (recounting
the havoc wreaked upon the family in the name of the state).
47. Han Fei Tzu, supra note 9, at 32-33.
48. id at 36.
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One beneficial legacy, however, may have resulted from the Legal-
ists' regime: They did proclaim an ideal of equality before the law,
albeit a savage equality.4 9 Nevertheless, the central legacy of Legalist
thought was the idea of the emperor as strongman unchecked by no-
tions of popular sovereignty.
B. The Confucian Humanism of Mencius and The Mandate of
Heaven-A Classical Ideal of Democratic Sovereignty
The Confucianism of Confucius is profoundly concerned with the
common good and the welfare of the people as the basis of a just state,
or rather a state in harmony with the tao.50 Yet the concept of the
people as ultimately sovereign is only implicit in the Analects. Con-
fucius's conservatism, forever looking back for a Golden Age, never
results in a clarion call for purging a wicked era of corrupt rulers in
the name of the people.5 '
The implicit concept of a sovereign people, however, becomes ex-
plicit in the writing of Confucius's greatest disciple, Mencius. Men-
cian political theory is likewise based on conformity with the dictates
of the Way. The emperor is the servant of the people,52 and when a
49. Confucianism proclaimed a hierarchy of loyalties, as can be seen in the exam-
ple of Honest Kung cited supra note 46. People are bound to each other by a complex
web of social relations known as kuan hsL Kuan hsi can be a humanizing factor, but
in a perverted form it can overcome the Confucian concept of lian, or integrity, as
well as the more utilitarian she, or shame at a loss of face, see Mencius, supra note 7,
bk. VII, pt. A, sec. 7, at 183, and lead to favoritism or a quid quo pro reciprocity which
in turn may lead to corruption. For a discussion of the concept of kuan hsi and its link
with corrupt practices, see Helena Kolenda, One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in
the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It, 4 J. Chinese L. 187, 197-201
(1990); see also Ambrose Yeo-chi King, Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociologi-
cal Interpretation, Daedalus, Spring 1991, at 65-68, 80 (illustrating the benign Con-
fucian ideal as opposed to its "devious" presence in contemporary China). See also
the discussion of "faction" in Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Faction-
alism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (1976).
50. Illustrative of this is the following advice Confucius, or Master K'ung, gives to
a Chinese ruler
Duke Ai asked, What can I do in order to get the support of the common
people? Master K'ung replied, If you 'raise up the straight and set them on
top of the crooked,' the commoners will support you. But if you raise the
crooked and set them on top of the straight, the commoners will not support
you.
Analects, supra note 31, bk. II, para. 19, at 92 (footnotes omitted).
51. The impulse to conserve and the impulse to reform reaches a holistic balance
in Confucius:
[Ildealization of the past.., set a high standard for the present, and pro-
vided more of an impetus to reform, than to maintain, the status quo. [Con-
fucius] sought to conserve or restore what was good, while changing what
was bad. Thus more fundamental to him than either conservatism or re-
formism in itself was a clear sense of moral values, expressed in his warm
humanity, optimism, humility, and good sense.
1 Sources, supra note 31, at 18.
52. Id. bk. VII, pt. B, sec. 14, at 196 ("The people are of supreme importance; the
altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler.").
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dissolute ruler becomes rapacious, sowing evil in society as well as the
cosmic order,5 3 the emperor's Mandate of Heaven (den ming)-, is
withdrawn, and the people are justified in exerting their sovereignty.55
While Mencius urges remonstration to spur the errant ruler to self-
reformation, revolution is the ultimate check against the ruler who
ceases to care for the moral and physical needs of his people: "If the
prince made serious mistakes, they would remonstrate with him, but if
repeated remonstrations fell on deaf ears, they would depose him."51
Even regicide was justified in such instances.57
Another Mencian concept particularly important for Sun Yat-sen
was the principle of benevolent rule. To Mencius, for virtue to win out
over vice and for harmony to reign in the realm, the people must be
allowed the means to care for their own livelihood. While a chiin-tzu
could overcome physical deprivation by remaining constant in the
Way, the common people are easily tempted toward criminality if they
are deprived of a livelihood-"[1]acking constant hearts, they will go
astray and fall into excesses, stopping at nothing. To punish them af-
53. Mencius, supra note 7, bk. IV, pt. A, sec. 1, at 118 ("[O]nly the benevolent
man is fit to be in high position. For a cruel man to be in high position is for him to
disseminate his wickedness among the people.").
54. For the origins of the Mandate of Heaven concept, see 1 Sources, supra note
31, at 6.
55. The following dialogue is illustrative of what the Mandate is:
"Is it true that Yao gave the Empire to Shun?" "No," said Mencius. "The
Emperor cannot give the Empire to another." "In that case who gave the
Empire to Shun?" "Heaven gave it to him... .The Emperor can recommend
a man to Heaven but he cannot make Heaven give this man the Empire; just
as a feudal lord can recommend a man to the Emperor but he cannot make
the Emperor bestow a fief on him .... In antiquity, Yao recommended Shun
to Heaven and Heaven accepted him; he presented him to the people and
the people accepted him. ... 'Heaven does not speak but reveals itself by its
acts and deeds.'. . If [Shun] had just moved into Yao's palace and ousted his
son, it would have been usurpation of the Empire, not receiving it from
Heaven. .. .'Heaven sees with the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the
ears of its people.'"
Mencius, supra note 7, bk. V, pt. A, sec. 5, at 143-44 (footnote omitted).
This passage is of particular importance in understanding the Confucian roots of
Sun Yat-sen's political thought. See text accompanying notes 142, 144.
56. Mencius, supra note 7, bk. V, pt. B, sec. 9, at 159. It is recorded that when
Mencius gave this answer to King Hstlan of Ch'i, "[t]he King blenched at this," and it
took him a few moments to regain his composure. Id
57. This is because "A man who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator, while one
who cripples rightness is a crippler. He who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an
'outcast.' I have indeed heard of the punishment of the 'outcast Tchou,' but I have
not heard of any regicide." Mencius, supra note 7, bk. I, pt. B, sec. 8, at 68. In other
words, the former king has forfeited the moral authority he once possessed, thus kill-
ing him would technically not constitute regicide. St. Thomas Aquinas similarly
writes in the Summa that "A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed
not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler .... Consequently there
is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind .... Indeed it is the tyrant
rather that is guilty of sedition." Summa Theologica, supra note 38, pt. l-IL, q. 42, 2d
Art., Reply Obj. 3, at 95.
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ter they have fallen foul of the law is to set a trap for the people. How
can a benevolent man in authority allow himself to set a trap for the
people?15 8 Thus, the clear-sighted ruler makes sure that "the people
always have sufficient food in good years and escape starvation in bad;
only then does he drive them towards goodness; in this way the people
find it easy to follow him." 59
According to Mencius, in keeping with the tradition of. providing for
the common good, a benevolent government would institute a "well-
field" system of land division.60 In this communitarian schema, a land
unit called ching is divided into nine equitable allotments. Individual
families farm the eight outside portions, ideally assisting their neigh-
bors when the need arises so as to "live in love and harmony. '61 Prior
to farming their own lot, however, the neighbors are collectively re-
sponsible for the center plot, the produce of which belongs to the
state. "Benevolent government," Mencius cautions, "must begin with
land demarcation. When boundaries are not properly drawn, the divi-
sion of land according to the well-field system and the yield of grain
used for paying officials cannot be equitable. For this reason, despotic
rulers and corrupt officials always neglect the boundaries."'6 Echoes
of Mencius's well-field system can be found in Sun's principle of the
People's Livelihood.63
Accounting for the conventions of his age, Mencius evinces a noble
liberality of vision and a political philosophy emphasizing the welfare
of the people, in whom sovereignty ultimately rests. This Mencian no-
tion of democratic sovereignty is squarely in the Confucian tradition
as well as non-individualistic; searching Mencius's writings for any
58. Mencius, supra note 7, bk. I, pt. A, sec. 7, at 58.
59. Id. at 158-59. See also 1 Sources, supra note 31, at 93-94 (containing text and
commentary regarding Mencius's economic principles necessary for humane govern-
ment); cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and
Ethics 14, 29 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., W.W. Norton 1988) (1265-67) (stating
that a ruler must provide sufficient material goods so that subjects may pursue virtue
without distraction).
60. For a discussion of the antique origins of the well-field system, see Wu, supra
note 26, at 134-36. For the etymology of the term, see D.C. Lau's explanation in
Mencius, supra note 7, at 99 n.2.
61. Mencius, supra note 7, bk. III, pt. A, sec. 3, at 100.
62. Id. at 99.
63. Sun's quasi-socialistic principle of the People's Livelihood, or min sheng, is
developed at length in Sun, supra note 14, at 151-212. Sun distinguishes People's
Livelihood from Western socialism, however, explicitly rejecting Marxism, id. at 153-
69. Sun, interestingly enough, found a little-known work entitled The Social Interpre-
tation of History by Maurice William, a Brooklyn dentist, to contain the definitive
rejection of Marxian principles. Id. at 155; see also 2 Sources of Chinese Tradition 114
(Win. Theodore de Bary et al. eds., Columbia Univ. Press 1960) [hereinafter 2
Sources]. For a discussion of the continuing relevance of the People's Livelihood con-
cept in contemporary Taiwan, see David S. da Silva Cornell, Note, Transferring the
"People's Livelihood" to the People: An Evaluation of Taiwan's Privitization Drive, 24
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 943 (1993).
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modem-day vocabulary of rights would be a quest most charitably de-
scribed as anachronistic.
C. Popular Sovereignty and Emperor in Imperial China
An examination of how the Mencian concept of sovereignty fared
throughout most of China's dynastic history, however, reveals that al-
legiance to the ideal often was vestigial at best. Claims that the em-
peror had lost the Mandate of Heaven and, hence, that rebellion was
justified could appear to be post hoc rationalizations of dynastic
change.64
This is not to say that Confucianism did not play an important func-
tion limiting the potential for despotism.6 The first dynasty to unify
all of China, the Ch'in (221-207 B.C.), 66 was the only dynasty to adopt
Legalism outright as a state ideology, and it collapsed as a direct result
of the harshness of the Legalist remedies it sought to impose.6 The
ensuing Han dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.D.) looked to synthesize Con-
fucian ideals with the Legalist's ability to regulate and to organize
state affairs: in other words, to co-opt Confucianism in support of the
imperial status quo. Han thinkers were concerned above all with clas-
sifying the universal and societal order along a hierarchy that they
perceived to exist naturally. 61 The hereditary emperor ruled, assisted
64. John King Fairbank, The United States and China 57 (4th ed. 1981) ("[A]ny
successful rebellion was justified, and a new rule sanctioned, by the very fact of its
success.").
65. Consider one historian's assessment:
[The teachings of Confucius seem to have provided the actual practice of
absolutism with more discouragement than encouragement .... [W]hen at-
tempts were made to exercise absolutist power, more often than not they
were met with vigorous and uncompromising opposition that drew its
strength from the public's knowledge and understanding of the Confucian
Classics ....
Wu, supra note 26, at 405.
66. Though one could speak of China as an entity sharing a cultural unity, in the
pre-Ch'in period a number of warring states had competed among each other. Utiliz-
ing the draconian Legalist ideology, the Ch'in were able to unite China under their
yoke. During this period, a standardization of the written language and measure-
ments occurred, as well as monumental infrastructure development. Thought was
also regimented, as the Legalists conducted book-burning campaigns. In 212 B.C. in
the Ch'in capital, Hsienyang, 460 scholars accused of slandering the emperor and
spreading heterodox ideas were executed in a most horrific manner-burial alive.
Dun J. IJ, The Ageless Chinese: A History 97-101 (3d ed. 1978).
67. Subjects were forced to render corvde labor, the penalty for tardiness was
death. In 209 B.C., workers who had been delayed in arriving at their work assign-
ment because of a flood, and hence were subject to certain execution, began a revolt
which soon enveloped the entire nation and led to the toppling of the tyrannical dy-
nasty. Id. at 102-03.
68. 1 Sources, supra note 31, at 146. Foremost among the Han theorists was Tung
Chung-shu (c. 179-c. 104 B.C.), who conceived of the ruler as the basis of the state,
ideally uniting heaven, earth, and humanity in holistic harmony. See id. at 162-65. A
very interesting critique of the Han Confucian-Legalist synthesis is contained in Her-
bert H.P. Ma, The Legalization of Confucianism and Its Impact on Family Relation-
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by a bureaucracy ranging from a chancellor down to local magistrates.
Examinations were given annually to select the best students of the
realm on the basis of their knowledge of the Confucian classics. Ex-
tensive bureaucratization led in practice to a diffusion of the em-
peror's power and served to check despotism.69
The T'ang dynasty criminal compendium of the seventh century
A.D., one of history's great legal codifications, also reflects a synthesis
between Legalist methods mitigated by Confucian benevolence. The
Code could be ruthless: The state punished plotting rebellion-the
greatest of the ten abominations-by not only decapitating principals,
but also by strangling the fathers and sons of the rebels and enslaving
grandparents and female relations (plus concubines), regardless of
guilt.70  Despite practices that appear incredibly harsh by modem
standards, ameliorating features in the T'ang Code are recognizable.
Confession usually lessened punishment,71 amnesties were common,72
and pregnant women who committed a capital crime would not be put
to death until a hundred days after giving birth.73 Stealing within the
extended family was treated more leniently, probably due to the Con-
fucian ideal that the family exists for the reciprocal needs of its
members.74
History likewise records examples of emperors who emulated Con-
fucian ideals. One proud example is T'ang T'ai-tsung. When asked
about the throne, he replied:
The first principle in kingship is to preserve the people. A king who
exploits the people for his personal gains is like a man who cuts his
own thighs to feed himself. As there is no such thing as a crooked
shadow following a straight object, it is inconceivable that the peo-
ple can be disloyal when their rulers are virtuous.75
ships, 65 Wash. U. L.Q. 667, 671-75 (1987). Ma, a prominent jurist on Taiwan, sees
the adulteration of humane Confucian concepts that occurred during this period as
negative; he advocates a contemporary Confucianism based on the traditional ideals
of jen and reciprocity and a rejection of the hierarchical, Legalist-inspired accretions
that originated with the Han synthesis. Id. at 674-79.
69. See Sun Yat-sen's discussion of the imperial bureaucracy as a check upon im-
perial despotism and as a model for the Examination Yuan. See infra notes 152-56 and
accompanying text. The censorate, whose duty was to denounce corruption and mal-
feasance of officials, served as the voice of the people when confronted by a corrupt
emperor: "When they felt it necessary, individual censors even criticized the actions
or policies of the emperor himself, sometimes at the cost of their lives." Wallace John-
son, Introduction to 1 The T'ang Code: General Principles 3, 5 (Wallace Johnson
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1979) [hereinafter T'ang Code].
70. Introduction to T'ang Code, supra note 69, at 18 (citing T'ang Code, art. 248).
71. Id. at 34-36.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 30 (citing T'ang Code, art. 494). A magistrate who executed a pregnant
woman was punished by two years of penal servitude, reduced to one year if one
hundred days had not passed since she gave birth. IAL at 30-31.
74. See id at 32.
75. Li, supra note 66, at 170, 172.
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Putting into practice what he preached, harmony reigned throughout
the realm; at the height of T'ang T'ai-tsung's rule "no banditry oc-
curred anywhere in the empire, and consequently the jails were often
empty."76 Taxation amounted to a mere one-fortieth of the annual
harvest-the lowest ever recorded in the annals of Chinese history.77
T'ang T'ai-tsung ruled by moral force, which could not but affect the
people. Anecdotal hagiographers recount that magistrates sentenced
three hundred criminals to death in various parts of the empire during
T'ang T'ai-tsung's reign. For the last months of their lives, they were
paroled by the emperor to spend their remaining time with their fami-
lies on the condition that they turn themselves in on the date of their
execution. Not one of the three hundred failed to show up.78
It is significant to note that T'ang T'ai-tsung's reign occurred in the
early years of the T'ang dynasty, shortly after the shifting of Heaven's
Mandate to a new dynasty. Later members of the T'ang imperial
household lived up to Lord Acton's oft-quoted axiom of power tend-
ing to corrupt, with absolute power corrupting absolutely.79
In response to the degeneration of the throne, the people were jus-
tified in asserting their sovereignty, a belief which pervaded China's
dynastic history and comprised a significant part of the intellectual
and moral Weltanschauung of literate Chinese.8° "People," of course,
means the peasantry, for China has always been a nation overwhelm-
76. Id. at 172.
77. Id.
78. Id. A good Confucian would note the contrast of their behavior with that of
Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang, the two men who began the revolt against the oppressive
Ch'in tyranny rather than submit to the supreme sanction for their tardiness. See
supra note 67.
79. John E. Dalberg-Acton, Acton-Creighton Correspondence, in Essays on Free-
dom and Power, 357, 364 (G. Himmelfarb ed., 1948). One example from the Tang
Dynasty would be the Empress Wu, who ruled from 685-705 and was one of the few
women in Chinese history to attain such power. Though an able administrator who
promoted competent officials based on merit, she had secured the throne by having
three of her own children assassinated and was an insatiable libertine. Later Tang
emperors were even worse, for they were incompetent in addition to being inconti-
nent, and were unable to preserve China's borders from barbarian invasion. As the
imperial court became beholden to conniving eunuchs, revolt and centrifugalism
spread, with the dynasty finally collapsing in 907. Li, supra note 66, at 170-77.
80. For example, the Manchu imperial edict of abdication, promulgated on Febru-
ary 12, 1912, states in part:
It is now evident that the hearts of the majority of the people are in favour
of a republican form of government .... From the preference of the people's
hearts, the Will of Heaven can be discerned. How could We then bear to
oppose the will of the millions for the glory of one Family! Therefore, ob-
serving the tendencies of the age on the one hand and studying the opinions
of the people on the other, We and His Majesty the Emperor hereby vest the
sovereignty in the People and decide in favour of a republican form of con-
stitutional government. Thus we would gratify on the one hand the desires
of the whole nation who tired of anarchy are desirous of peace, and on the
other hand would follow in the footsteps of the Ancient Sages, who regarded
the Throne as the sacred trust of the Nation.
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ingly based on agriculture. Mencius recorded commoners who in an-
tiquity had risen to the throne,8' and the founders of both the Han
and the Ming dynasties, Liu Pang (d. 195 B.C.) and Chu Ytlan-chang
(1328-1398) respectively,8 were of peasant stock-a fact never lost on
Mao Tse-tung, whose contributions to Marxist theory most promi-
nently included the idea that the peasantry, not the proletariat, can be
the revolutionary class, particularly in underdeveloped countries.83
But as the case of the nineteenth-century peasant revolutionaries
known as the Taipings84 indicates, the peasantry's revolutionary force
Imperial Edicts of Abdication, reprinted in Constitution and Supplementary Laws and
Documents of the Republic of China 1-2 (photo. reprint 1976) (1924) [hereinafter
Supplementary Laws and Documents].
81. Shun, who was recommended to Heaven by the Emperor Yao, see supra note
55, was "a common man." Mencius, supra note 7, bk. V, pt. B, sec. 3, at 153.
82. Li, supra note 66, at 274. Chinese sources report that the first Ming emperor
was one of the ugliest men to ever grace the earth, yet by force of will he was able to
rise from beggar to emperor, overthrowing the alien Yflan dynasty of the Mongols in
the process. Id.
83. Mao Tse-tung, The Importance of the Peasant Problem in 2 Sources, supra
note 63, at 205 ("[T]he rise of the present peasant movement is a colossal event....
[S]everal hundred million peasants will rise[,J ... a force so extraordinarily swift and
violent that no power... will be able to suppress it.... All revolutionary parties and
all revolutionary comrades will stand before them to be tested, and to be accepted or
rejected as they decide.").
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels viewed China as a dullard nation, similar to Ralph
Waldo Emerson's enlightened nineteenth-century characterization. Lowe, supra note
2, at 19 (quoting Karl Marx, Marx on China, 1853-1860: Articles from the New York
Daily Tribune 4, 45 (1951)) (stating that Marx had described China as "a mummy
carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin" and that Engels wrote of China as
"the rotting semi-civilization of the oldest state of the world"). The Manifesto speaks
of the "idiocy of rural life" and how the bourgeoisie "has made barbarian and semi-
barbarian countries dependant on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of
bourgeois [sic], the East on the West." Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of
the Communist Party 13 (Frederick Engels ed., Int'l Publishers 1948) (1848). Lenin
viewed revolution in China as coming through the proletariat. Lowe, supra note 2, at
64-81. Likewise Trotskyites were orthodox Marxists at least in regard to their "un-
swerving condemnation of the Maoist development of Chinese Communism as a
peasant perversion." Benjamin Schwartz, Introduction to the Third Edition of Leon
Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution at iii (3d ed. 1966). For a discussion of
Mao's shifting of the revolutionary class paradigm, see Bianco, supra note 28; see also
Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence
of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (1962) (describing how Mao, unlike Chiang Kai-
shek, successfully harnessed peasant nationalism in the war against the Japanese).
Most communist insurrections in Asia have been Maoist in inspiration, whereby
peasant-based armies in the countryside encircle urban areas. See Mao Tse-tung, The
Present Situation and Our Tasks, in Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung 51, 53
(English ed. 1967). The most notorious was Pol Pot's revolution in Cambodia; the
New People's Army in the Philippines similarly looks to Mao for its inspiration. For
an account of the latter in their heyday prior to the overthrow of Philippine dictator
Ferdinand Marcos, see Ross H. Munro, The New Khemer Rouge, Commentary, Dec.
1985, at 19, 19-38. For an account of a successful counterinsurgency campaign in
southeast Asia, see Noel Barber, War of the Running Dogs (1971) (recounting how
British tactics and strategy in peninsular Malaya, in contrast with that of the United
States in Vietnam, successfully thwarted the Maoist insurgents).
84. See infra part II.A.
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can be dissipated if it is not guided. 5 Peasant revolts as an expression
of popular revulsion over imperial corruption and injustice may have
been common throughout the history of old China, yet in the modem
age that was fast dawning, the people would have to be channelled
towards a nationalistic cause, championing not only their own sover-
eignty, but also that of China. 6
85. For a discussion of Sun's Confucian-based notion of "tutelage," see infra notes
122-23, 149-50 and accompanying text. Cf. the Bolshevik notion of the Vanguard, dis-
cussed infra note 86.
86. Chalmers Johnson argues that Mao's communist revolution was successful pre-
cisely because it was able to mobilize peasant nationalism more effectively than the
Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek had in the patriotic war against Japan (1937-45).
Johnson, supra note 83, at 1-6. Notably, Sun Yat-sen is revered on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait because he was the first modem revolutionary to appeal to the ideals of
the Chinese people in a great nationalistic undertaking against foreign oppressors.
Beyond that, the reasons for admiring Sun in the two Chinas is quite different. In the
Republic of China on Taiwan, his Three Principles of the People form the basis of the
state: "The Republic of China [is] founded on the Three Principles of the People."
ROC Const. ch. I, art. 1. This Note posits that the Principle of Democracy, though
springing in part from humanistic roots quite different from those of the West, is a
concept capable of being interpreted as broadly analogous to Western notions of pop-
ular sovereignty. The democratization underway in Taiwan is significant because the
popular sovereignty promised by the republican constitution is beginning to emerge
after decades of suppression.
From a traditional Marxian perspective, however, Sun ushered in the bourgeois
stage of history;, according to the theory of dialectical materialism, this stage must be
passed through before getting to the final stage of conflict between capitalist and
worker (thesis and antithesis) that would result in the inevitable victory of the prole-
tariat (synthesis), to be followed by the withering away of the state following the
implementation of true communism. See Marx & Engels, supra note 83, at 9-21. Cf.
Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist
History 9 (1967) (discussing the reasons the Chinese Communists utilized bourgeois
allies like the Kuomintang). It is important to distinguish a Marxian meaning of de-
mocracy from what democracy means in this Note. A communist state like the Peo-
ple's Republic of China is one where, by Marxian definition, the people have emerged
supreme from their conflict with the bourgeoisie-thus the state is already "demo-
cratic." Before the state can wither away, however, socialism must first be built under
the guidance of the revolutionary Vanguard (Lenin's term) that had led it to its "inev-
itable" victory over the bourgeoisie. Thus Chou En-lai, prime minister and number-
two man in the mainland's government during the Maoist era, was able to call China
"democratic" consistent with the internal logic of Marxism:
Democratic centialism operates in our state organs by combining wide-
spread democracy with a high degree of centralism. We are not practicing
democracy for its own sake. We need widespread democracy because we
want to rally all the forces that can be rallied to build socialism .... As laid
down in the provisions of our Constitution, citizens of our country enjoy a
wide measure of democracy and freedom.
"Report of the Work of the Government" (delivered to the Fourth Session of the First
National People's Congress, June 26, 1957) in Quotations from Chou En-lai 5, 5
(1969). Parsing the political meaning of the statement, Chou is speaking of a "democ-
racy" capable of countenancing totalitarian behavior in the name of the people or
socialism.
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II. THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION OF SUN YAT-SEN
Sun Yat-sen's Revolution of 1911, like the communist revolution of
1949, is often viewed as a radical shift, setting up an entirely new re-
gime that broke with the past." This view has some legitimacy; none-
theless, the republican revolution built upon ideas that were implicit
in Chinese notions of the political order.' In large part, Confucian
concepts of morality and the people's ultimate sovereignty lent them-
selves to the reformer's effort, while the revolt against the Manchu
tyranny can be seen in part as a revolt against China's despotic, Legal-
ist heritage.89 Sun, though a democrat who believed in equality of
opportunity as opposed to equality of result,90 was nevertheless well
aware of the ignorance and political unsophistication of the masses,
and thus retained an elitist Confucian conception of the necessity of
educating and guiding the people.9
A. Backdrop to Revolution
On the eve of the twentieth century, China was a sorry sight indeed,
and it is easy to see what may have provoked Emerson's earlier out-
burst. Moral decay was endemic, China rife with opium smoking,
footbinding, concubinage, and female infanticide. 92 The nation had
been ruled since 1644 by the non-Chinese Manchus, 93 whose Ch'ing
87. See, e.g., Edwin A. Wmckler in Constitutional Reform and the Future of the
Republic of China 11, 13 (Harvey J. Feldman ed., 1991) [hereinafter Constitutional
Reform] (seeing Sun's republican constitutionalism as radical); see discussion infra
part IV.
88. Though a full discussion of the Communist Revolution of 1949 is beyond the
scope of this Note, it too had historical precursors. Certainly Mao's idea of the peas-
antry as the revolutionary class, discussed supra note 83, comes from his reading of
Chinese history. More ominous are certain parallels between the classical totalitari-
anism of Han Fei-tzu and the modem totalitarianism of Mao Tse-tung. See supra note
10.
89. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Sun, supra note 14, at 82 ("If we pay no attention to each man's
intellectual endowments and capacities and push down those who rise to a high posi-
tion in order to make all equal, the world will not progress and mankind will retro-
cede.... After the revolution, we want every man to have an equal political standing
.... " (emphasis added)).
91. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
92. See Sun's appraisal infra text accompanying note 120.
93. Ethnic Chinese are referred to as "Han." The Manchus came from Manchu-
ria, on the northeast periphery of the Chinese world. Throughout its history, China
has played Greece to a variety of barbarian Romes. The Ytan dynasty (1260-1368),
for example, was founded by wild Mongol hordesmen who subsequently became
sinicized. Theirs was the stately court of Cathay visited by Marco Polo as well as the
Franciscan missionaries led by John of Montecorvino, its splendor memorialized cen-
turies later by the English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge: "In Xanadu did Kubla
Khan a stately pleasure-dome decree .... ." Samuel T. Coleridge, Kubla Khan, in
Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge 44, 44 (Donald A. Stauffer ed., The Modem
Library 1951) (1816). For accounts of these early east-west encounters, consult Marco
Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo 83-133 (Ronald Latham trans., Penguin Books 1958)
(n.d.); A.C. Moule, Christians in China Before the Year 1550, at 166-215 (photo. re-
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Dynasty court was a place of byzantine scheming among eunuchs and,
since 1862, by a usurping dowager empress named Tz'u Hsi.' China
was teetering under incessant Western imperialistic pressure that had
been building for more than a century.
In 1793, the Earl of Macartney had arrived in Peking95 as an envoy
of King George III, seeking trade privileges. British sources maintain
that he never performed the kowtow, the obsequious act of prostrat-
ing oneself completely before the emperor.96 Chinese records state
that indeed Macartney had performed the kowtow, as was customary
for Dutch, Russian, Portuguese, and Papal envoys, not to mention the
Emperor's own subjects.97 To the Chinese, these "South Sea Barbari-
ans " 9 8 had come to offer homage, as "all under heaven" should right-
fully do. 9 They further viewed the British use of flour paste and oil to
style their coiffures as a preposterous waste of comestibles.100
From these Gilbert-and-Sullivanesque encounters, the Vest began
to erode the Middle Kingdom's pretensions of cultural superiority and
to encroach on Chinese sovereignty. Most egregious were the British.
British demand for Chinese porcelain, tea, and other goods increased,
creating an unequal balance of trade that, under the prevailing mer-
cantilist theory of economics, needed to be addressed.10 The way to
print 1972) (1930). For Chinese recounts of encounters during the first part of the
Manchu Ch'ing dynasty, see 1 & 2 A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Westem Rela-
tions (1644-1820) (Lo-Shu Fu ed. & trans., 1966).
94. Tz'u Hsi was an imperial concubine who was made co-regent for her son, the
child emperor, in 1862. Her power strengthened as she outmaneuvered others with
whom she was to exercise authority jointly. After the death of her emperor son from
venereal disease in 1875, she placed a nephew, Kuang-hsUJ, on the throne, thus violat-
ing the rules governing imperial succession and tightening her grip on power. Though
Kuang-hstl would clash with her as he grew older, she retained actual power until
1908. Li, supra note 66, at 410-14. Actual empresses in Chinese history have been
quite rare, the Empress Wu (624-705) in the 'ang dynasty (618-906) being a notable
exception. See supra note 79.
95. To return to the vexing romanization question, see supra note 12, the pre-
ferred transliteration for "Peking" at present is "Beijing," in accord with the main-
land's pinyin romanization. Because most older English-language sources consulted
herein use "Peking," I retain it.
96. John T. Meskill, History of China, in An Introduction to Chinese Civilization
196 (John T. Meskill ed., 1973).
97. Id. at 196.
98. Chinese sources originally referred to the Europeans as "South Sea Barbari-
ans," for that was the direction from which their ships had approached the Chinese
coast. Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial 73 (1948).
99. See id. at 71-72.
100. Timothy Severin, The Oriental Adventure: Explorers of the East 139 (1976).
101. Mercantilism holds that the wealth of a nation lies in its hoard of precious
metals; thus, the goal of a nation should be to export as much as possible and import
as little as possible, preferably collecting payment in gold and silver. This zero-suni,
inflationary theory was challenged most importantly by David Ricardo's theory of
comparative advantage, extolling the mutual benefit to nations of a free-trade regime
in which countries were free to dedicate themselves to producing products for which
they were best suited (i.e., Britain should abandon any ill-conceived pretensions of
producing a halfway drinkable port, instead importing the beverage from the Portu-
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reverse the balance was simple-export Indian opium to the Chinese,
and allow its addictive qualities to ensure a healthy demand. The Chi-
nese were understandably incensed, and in 1838 launched their ver-
sion of a war on drugs, seizing and destroying the foreigners' stocks of
opium in the southern city of Canton, the West's principal port of en-
try to China.112 In 1839, the British promptly launched their own war,
the opprobrious Opium War, forcing the Chinese to reconsider their
attempts to ban the toxin and to accept the Treaty of Nanking.10 3
British appetite, once whetted, was difficult to sate. A second war,
or rather a series of Anglo-French expeditions known collectively as
the "Arrow" War (1856-60), 104 further humbled China and acceler-
ated the signing of unequal treaties whereby China was forced to open
more cities to Western trade.105 Extraterritorial concessions allowed
the Western powers the right to try their subjects for crimes commit-
ted on Chinese soil, and foreign gunboats plied China's rivers. The
Chinese chafed under the indignities inflicted upon them.
Internal disorders also mounted. Beginning in the 1840s, an icono-
clastic, quasi-Christian sect known as the Taipings began to gather ad-
herents among the peasantry of Kwangsi province in southern
China.'0 6 In Taiping eyes, the Manchus were demons to be exorcised.
By December of 1850, under the charismatic leadership of a peasant
seer named Hung Hsiu-ch'Uan, 107 a full-blown military insurrection
guese while concentrating their resources in sheep farming and the export of wool).
David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 128-49 (Piero
Sraffa ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1951) (3d ed. 1821).
102. See generally Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (1958)
(providing an account of the war sympathetic to the Chinese perspective).
103. The Treaty of Nanking, executed in 1842, resulted in the ceding of Hong Kong
island to Great Britain. It was followed by a number of other treaties, such as the
Treaty of the Bogue (1843), which granted the United Kingdom extraterritorial privi-
leges in China and the Treaty of Wang-hsia (1844), which granted the same privileges
to the United States and even expanded American jurisdiction to civil, in addition to
criminal, cases.
104. The Arrow was a riverboat owned by a disreputable Chinese merchant and
manned by a Chinese crew. She was believed, however, to have been registered in
Hong Kong. Had this been so-the registration had actually expired-she would
technically have been a British vessel. Seizing upon a rightful Chinese interdiction of
the vessel for piracy as a pretext, the British set out to punish the Chinese. The
French causus belli arose from the execution of a priest and his converts in interior
China-thus cloaking their intervention with a smidgen more principle relative to the
British, assuming one accepts their justifications at face value. See Li, supra note 66, at
395-96.
105. Id.
106. Their basic creeds and manifestos are reprinted, along with explanatory text,
in 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 18-42. Other anti-Manchu movements included the
Nien revolt in Anhwei and Shantung provinces, which lasted from 1853-68, and major
unrest on the part of Muslim minorities in southwestern China (1855-73) and in the
northwest (1862-77). Id. at 43-44.
107. As a young man, Sun Yat-sen was quite enamored of this peasant revolution-
ary from southern China. Acquaintances, who thought of the young Sun as a sincere
but quixotic armchair bomb-thrower, nicknamed him "Hung Hsiu-ch'tlan." (Sun was
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had begun. °8 In 1853, the major city of Nanking was seized and
renamed "Heavenly Capital," or T'ien-ching. The rebels overex-
tended themselves, however, and Western powers that were perhaps
initially sympathetic to their Christian-overlaid monotheism came to
shun them-particularly when it appeared that the Taipings would
threaten business at the port city of Shanghai.1 9 The Manchus rallied,
finally routing the rebels by 1864, but not without first revealing their
internal weaknesses.
The Taipings, however, were not China's last mystical mass move-
ment in the unsettled nineteenth century. As the century came to a
close, a secret society known as the Society of the Righteous and Har-
monious Fists, or "Boxers," began to rail against the foreigners bedev-
iling the once-illustrious Middle Kingdom. The dowager Tz'u Hsi and
a circle of retrogressive ministers ° channeled the ever-latent xeno-
phobia away from the Manchus and toward China's external tormen-
tors, as the Boxers butchered missionaries and Chinese deemed to be
pro-Western in the provinces.' Encouraged by the Manchu court,
the Boxers laid siege to the foreign legation compound in Peking for
fifty-five days in 1900.112 Western retribution1 3 was swift, and after
known to experiment surreptitiously with explosives in chemistry lab while attending
medical school.) Schiffrin, supra note 12, at 23.
108. Fundamentalist in tenor, the Taipings's "militant monotheism, prophetic inspi-
ration, and drive for power in the name of God," made the rebellion reminiscent of
the rise of Islam, despite the Christian trappings. 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 24.
109. ld. at 22. As the fortunes of the Taipings began to decline, Hung Hsiu-ch'lan
became more and more profligate, living with a harem while still enjoining his follow-
ers to maintain their puritanical demeanor. Ia. at 23.
110. Most reform-minded ministers had been quashed in 1898 following a brief
flowering of reform that year. One should not dwell on the Manchus' mischiefs with-
out recalling their merits; although the Confucian-inspired attempts of officials associ-
ated with the reformist K'ang Yu-wei to rejuvenate China were spumed by the court
they served, their ideals were echoed in the republican revolution of Sun Yat-sen. For
a discussion of K'ang Yu-wei's revival of Confucian ideals in service of a modem
imperial China, see Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modem China and a New World: K'ang
Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (1975).
111. Unsurprisingly, the Boxer movement began in rural areas and its devotees
were ragtag peasants imbued with Taoist mummery. See Peter Fleming, The Siege at
Peking 48-51 (1959); Li, supra note 66, at 427-30. Such violent xenophobia was not
unprecedented; in 878 during the T'ang dynasty, the rebel Huang Ch'ao seized Can-
ton and slaughtered 120,000 foreigners. I&. at 175-76. Arabic sources confirm that in
the year of the Hejira 264 [877-78 A.D.], "six score thousand" Muslims, Jews, and
Parsees were killed in Khanfu [Canton], and that "[t]he exact number of those who
perished of these four religions could be known because the Chinese levied a tax on
these foreigners according to their number." Moule, supra note 93, at 76 & n.97
(quoting translations of Arabic sources).
112. For a retelling of the rousing Boxer siege of the Western and Japanese lega-
tions in Peking, see Fleming, supra note 111.
113. Or, technically speaking, reprisal, which is a "hostile measure short of war."
International Law 1220 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1991).
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relieving the garrison via an expeditionary force,"' the foreigners im-
posed harsh reparations.1 5
Such was the state of the world which confronted a young idealistic
doctor from Canton named Sun Yat-sen who, while living abroad,
tried to rally the overseas Chinese communities to the cause of revolu-
tion.'1 6 While there had been sincere attempts to reform the imperial
system, 1 7 Sun saw a need to wipe away the dross of centuries in order
to reassert the Mencian belief in the ultimate sovereignty of the peo-
ple by establishing a modem republic in China.
B. Sun Yat-sen's Republican Revolution
In the same year as Russia's premature Revolution of 1905, Sun
Yat-sen first enunciated his "Three Stages of Revolution."' 18 In a
China still smarting from its chastisement by the Western powers and
by Japan following the Boxer revolt, the nation had to rid itself of the
alien Manchu oppressors 1 9 before it could begin to realize its des-
114. A Western eyewitness to the relief expedition reported that "[e]very town,
every village, every peasant's hut in the path of the troops was first looted and then
burned." Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-
45, at 33 (1970) (quoting veteran journalist Thomas Millard).
115. The monetary portion of the compensation was set at $333 million. The lion's
share of this went to the Russians; reparations owed America amounted to $25 mil-
lion, the bulk of which was later set aside to provide scholarships for Chinese students
to study in the United States. Li, supra note 66, at 430-31.
116. As a youngster, Sun lived in Hawaii, where his older brother was a well-estab-
lished shopkeeper who later assisted him in raising funds for the revolutionary cause.
Schiffrin, supra note 12, at 11-14, 40-42. New York buffs will be interested to note
that while raising funds in Chinatown, he stayed at 10 Mott Street. Gwen Kinkead,
Chinatown: A Portrait of a Closed Society 55 (1992).
117. See supra note 110.
118. In 1895, Sun had tried to stage a premature putsch in Canton with his co-
conspirators in the Hsing Chung Hui, or the "Revive China League." For the defini-
tive English language account of this incident, as well as Sun's early years as a revolu-
tionary, consult Schiffrin, supra note 12, at 56-97.
Contemporary Western commentators observed the antics of the young revolution-
ary with annoyed disdain. Following the kidnapping and detention of Sun by Ch'ing
legates in London in 1897, the normally broad-minded Robert Hart, who served as
Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, groused:
As regards Dr. Sun-it must not be forgotten that he plotted and caused
trouble at [Canton] and made use of British territory [i.e., Hong Kong] to
work mischief for a neighbouring friendly power: so he deserves no sympa-
thy at all, and, had he been caught in China, would very properly have been
'hanged, drawn, and quartered.'
Letter from Robert Hart to James Duncan Campbell (Jan. 3, 1897), in 2 The I.G. in
Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907, at 1098 (John
King Fairbank et al. eds., 1975).
119. Among the indignities that Han Chinese suffered under the Manchus was the
wearing of the queue, a long braid of hair which could not be cut, worn as a reminder
to the Chinese of their subservient status. Han Chinese on the eve of the twentieth
century still would recount the bloodletting that attended the Manchu rise to power in
the seventeenth century, in particular the ten-day pillage of Yangchow and the car-
nage in the city of Chia-ting. Schiffrin, supra note 12, at 88 & n.96.
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tined greatness as a modem nation. Thus, according to Sun, the first
stage of revolution was to be one of destruction, in which "[t]he revo-
lutionary army undertakes to overthrow the Manchu tyranny, to erad-
icate the corruption of officialdom, to eliminate depraved customs, to
exterminate the system of slave girls, [and] to wipe out the scourge of
opium.1 20
According to Sun's thesis, the second stage was to be transitional-
a provisional constitution would be promulgated, providing for local
self-government on the district (hsien) level under the direction of the
revolutionary government, whose army would be busy wiping up
resistance.' 2 ' As the peasant populace had not been prepared for de-
mocracy, Sun predicted that this period would be one of political "tu-
telage"-not an indefinite stage like the period of Communist
dictatorship before the withering away of the state that Marx spoke
about," but one initially envisioned to last six years. 23
After the six-year tutelage expired and stability was attained, the
third stage would begin: "[D]istricts which have become full-fledged
self-governing units are each entitled to elect one representative to
form the National Assembly. The task of the Assembly would be to
adopt a five-power constitution and to organize a central government
consisting of five branches." 24 Thus, a modem Republic was to be
born.
Manchu resiliency lasted another six years following the issuance of
the rebel manifesto, as the imperial government, prompted by mount-
ing popular discontent, stumbled in the direction of institutional re-
form.2 Sun united his cohorts in a revolutionary society called the
120. Sun Yat-sen, Chung-shan ch'aan-shu, VoL II, Chien-kuo fang-lileh, Part I,
translated in 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 117-18.
121. Id at 118.
122. See discussion supra note 86. The concept of tutelage, see infra text accompa-
nying note 149, is derived from Confucian sensibilities, not Marxian notions.
123. The six-year time frame was later modified and extended.
124. Sun Yat-sen, Chung-shan ch'ian-shu, Vol. II, Chien-kuo fang-ltleh, Part I,
translated in 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 118. Sun's plan for a five-branch govern-
ment, consisting of familiar Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, as well as
Examination and Control (censorate) branches, will be discussed in greater detail in-
fra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
125. Mn-ch'ien T.Z. Tyau, China's New Constitution and International Problems
9-13 (photo. reprint 1976) (1918). The Manchu government sent five officials in De-
cember of 1905 to Japan, Europe, and the United States to study constitutional sys-
tems. In response to their positive recommendations, the first imperial edict to refer
to a constitutional form of government was issued on September 1, 1906. On Septem-
ber 20, 1907 a unicameral State Council (Tzu Chng Yuan) was proclaimed, presided
over jointly by a Manchu prince and a Han Grand Secretary; on October 19, 1907 the
throne allowed the creation of provincial assemblies in all the provincial capitals. The
purpose of the assemblies would be "to ascertain the public opinion, so that the peo-
ple in the provinces may have the opportunity of pointing out and stating the benefits
and evils existing in their particular provinces, and also planning the local peace and
being trained for service in the State Council in the Capital." Id. at 11 (quoting edict
of Oct. 19, 1907). The provincial assemblies were established on October 14, 1909,
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T'ung-meng Hui, or the League of Common Alliance. 26 The conspir-
ators brewed sedition until the confluence of events lead to an auspi-
cious opening for outright revolution. On October 10, 1911,127 revolt
erupted in the city of Wuchang, located in the central province of Hu-
peh.128 Rather than unleashing a great conflagration, the revolt initi-
ated a series of provincial coups d'etat, primarily in the southern and
central provinces.'
2 9
In an attempt to curb the rebel tide, the Manchu State Council' 3°
promulgated a nineteen-article constitution on November 3, circum-
scribing the powers of the Emperor and outlining a constitutional
monarchy.131 This sop could not dissuade the ascendant revolution-
aries. On November 30, 1911, twenty-three republican delegates met
in liberated Wuchang and devised their own twenty-one article com-
pact. 132 Shortly thereafter the city of Nanking fell to the revolutionary
forces, which Provisional President Sun made the provisional capital
of the provisional government. The Republic of China was formally
proclaimed on January 1, 1912, and on February 12, the Manchus for-
followed by the opening of the State Council on October 3, 1910. Id. at 13. Their
resolutions were merely precatory, however, as any significant initiative first needed
imperial sanction. A second edict in August of the following year promised a granting
of a constitution in nine years time (i.e., by 1917) and the convocation of a national
parliament. Id. at 12-13.
126. This organization is the direct precursor to Sun's Kuomintang, or KMT, which
sometimes is translated in Western sources as the Nationalist Party. The Kuomintang,
founded in 1912, constitutes the present government on Taiwan. The T'ung Meng
Hui's predecessor was the Hsing Chung Hui.
127. This date, "Double Ten" is still celebrated in Taiwan and countless Chinatowns
throughout the world as the birthday of the Republic of China, though the actual
proclamation of the new Republic did not occur until January 1, 1912. On the main-
land and among overseas Chinese who sympathize with its communist government,
October 1 is celebrated as the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of
China in 1949. See Kinkead, supra note 116, at 65-67.
128. One issue which must be addressed is how much Sun Yat-sen actually contrib-
uted to the immediate outbreak of revolution in 1911. At the time of the Wuchang
revolt, Sun was in the United States, rallying overseas Chinese support, and was una-
ware that the revolution had begun until reading an account in a Denver newspaper.
Because of this, and because of Sun's quixotic revolutionary penchant, some have
downplayed his role to that of a "political medicine man," to borrow the words of
John Paton Davies, Jr., a China-born former American foreign service officer. John
Paton Davies, Jr., Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian En-
counters With China and One Another 59 (1972). More charitable and perhaps more
illuminating, however, is the assessment of Sir John Jordan, the British minister at
Peking, who stated that when revolution did break out, Sun was "undoubtedly its
prime mover." Quoted in Wilbur, supra note 15, at 18 n.22. Sun returned to China
shortly thereafter to assume the provisional presidency of the Republic.
129. See Young, supra note 27, at 28-29.
130. See supra note 125.
131. The text of this document, called "China's Magna Charta," is reprinted in
Tyau, supra note 125, at 14-16.
132. This would form the basis of the provisional constitution of Nanking promul-
gated on March 11, 1912. Id. at 17.
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mally abdicated. 3 3 Their parting document states that a former gen-
eral in the imperial army named Yuan Shih-k'ai, whose defection sped
the republican overthrow of the wheezing dynasty, "was elected by
the Tzu cheng-yuan [State Council] to be the Premier."'3 The docu-
ment continues: "Let Yuan Shih-k'ai organize with full powers a pro-
visional republican government and confer with the Republican Army
as to the methods of union, thus ... forming the one Great Republic
of China ... ."I" Yuan Shih-k'ai's selection would prove very fateful
indeed for the infant Republic, for he would attempt to resuscitate the
imperial system with himself as emperor, 136 basing his claim on the
idea that republicanism and democracy were incompatible with the
Chinese tradition-a claim that Sun Yat-sen sought to prove false.1 37
C. Republican Ideology and the Principle of Democracy:
Chinese-and Western-Sources
Sun was very much aware that the Chinese tradition contained a
deeply ingrained absolutist strain. Indeed he remarked that the Chi-
nese people "have been soaked in the poison of absolute monarchy
for several thousand years."'13 Yet the republicans looked to an in-
digenous Chinese tradition of democratic sovereignty to justify their
revolution and its Three People's Principles of Nationalism, Democ-
racy, and "People's Livelihood," a fact that can easily be
overlooked. 39
For Sun, the Principle of Democracy meant the "people's sover-
eignty;"'" democracy, as a solitary word, "has only lately been intro-
133. See supra note 80.
134. Imperial Edicts of Abdication, reprinted in Supplementary Laws and Docu-
ments, supra note 80, at 1-2.
135. Id. Sun resigned the provisional presidency on February 13, 1912, the provi-
sional senate elected Yuan president (not premier) two days later, and on March 10,
he assumed the provisional presidency. Yearbook of the Republic of China 1994, at
665 (Gov't Info. Off. 1994) [hereinafter Yearbook].
136. See infra text accompanying notes 171-86.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
138. Sun Yat-sen, Chung-shan cha'tan-shu, VoL II, Chien-kuo fang-leh, Part I.
translated in 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 120.
139. As Hu Han-min, a revolutionary comrade of Sun remarked in a 1905 mani-
festo, "People who depend on hearsay all argue that the Chinese nation lacks the
tradition of democracy in its history .... Alas! they are not only ignorant of political
science but unqualified to discuss history." Hu Han-min, The Six Principles of the
People's Report, in 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 102.
Very telling are the words of nWm-ch'ien T.Z. Tyau, LL.D., the editor of The Peking
Leader and a legal academic respected in both China and the West during the early
years of the Republic. Dr. Tyau wrote in 1917 that "We need to go to the dawn of
Chinese history, if we are to ascertain the true origin of Chinese constitutional seed-
lings.... [The] foundation is China's unwritten constitution, or the science of govern-
ment erected on the political philosophy of the Confucian Classics." Tyau, supra note
125, at 2.
140. Sun, supra note 14, at 52.
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duced into China.' 14' Yet, Sun went on to argue, democracy is what
the modern Chinese people are best suited for because the concept,
though not expressed in a modern vocabulary of popular sovereignty
or rights, is implicit in the Chinese political tradition:
Confucius and Mencius two thousand years ago spoke for people's
rights. Confucius said, 'When the Great Doctrine prevails, all under
heaven will work for the common good.' He was pleading for a free
and fraternal world in which the people would rule. He was con-
stantly referring to Yao and Shun simply because they did not try to
monopolize the empire. Although their government was autocratic
in name, yet in reality they gave the people power and so were
highly reverenced by Confucius. Mencius said, 'Most precious are
the people; next come the land and grain; and last, the princes.'
Again: 'Heaven sees as the people see, Heaven hears as the people
hear,' and 'I have heard of the punishment of the tyrant Chou, but
never of the assassination of a sovereign.' He, in his age, already
saw that kings were not absolutely necessary and would not last for-
ever, so he called those who brought happiness to the people holy
monarchs, but those who were cruel and unprincipled he called indi-
vidualists whom all should oppose. Thus China more than two mil-
lenni[a] ago had already considered the idea of democracy .... 142
This Confucian tradition and its rejection of autocracy, coupled with
the new vocabulary of democracy, would form the basis of a new re-
public. Republican structures imported from the West, crafted to suit
the Chinese disposition, 4 3 would fulfill the latent political ideals of
Confucius and Mencius, whose lofty conceptions of the common good
were limited by the governmental structures extant in their time:
As we study Chinese history, we find that the governments of Yao,
Shun, Yu, T'ang, Wen Wang, and Wu Wang are always lauded and
held in admiration by the Chinese people; Chinese of every period
hoped that they might have a government like those, which would
seek the welfare of the people. Before Western democratic ideas
penetrated China, the deepest desire of the Chinese people was for
emperors like Yao, Shun, Yu, T'ang, Wen Wang and Wu Wang ....
But since our recent revolution, the people have absorbed demo-
cratic ideas and are no longer satisfied with those ancient
emperors.' 44
141. Id. at 58.
142. Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted). Sun elsewhere refers to this tradition: "Before
the day of despotic emperors, China had the splendid rulers Yao and Shun; they both
opened the throne to the people and did not attempt to keep it in their own family.
Autocracy did not flower until after Yao and Shun ... ." Id. at 121
143. For example, by adding Control and Examination branches, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 153-56.
144. Sun, supra note 14, at 114 (citations omitted). Sun, whose systematic educa-
tion began when his family emigrated to Hawaii, learned Chinese history by reading it
himself. He was nevertheless well-versed in the ancient annals, and particularly en-
amored of the Han dynasty, a period which saw a great synthesis between Confucian
1220 [Vol. 64
1995] CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON TAIWAN
Sun then went on to note that the people's desire for self-government,
though laudable, must nonetheless be directed-"If we let this atti-
tude [of opposition to government spawned by the democratic im-
pulse] continue without any attempt to change it, it will be
exceedingly difficult for government to make any progress.' 45
Sun qualified his ideal of democracy; the observation that unfet-
tered rule of the people could trample on liberties' that are better
guarded in a republican system is consonant with the American expe-
rience as well.147 Yet the true inspiration for Sun's wariness-as well
as his democratic optimism-comes from the Confucian tradition, de-
spite obvious borrowings from the West.1'8 Sun felt that China was in
need of tutelage, recalling a tradition of benevolent Confucian elitism.
Sun had a very Confucian faith in the ability of a modem-day body of
chian tzu-a revolutionary elite versed in the Three Principles-to ed-
ucate the masses:
Even an ox can be trained to plow the field and a horse to carry
man. Are men not capable of being trained? ... China... needs a
republican government just as a boy needs school. As a schoolboy
must have good teachers and helpful friends, so the Chinese people,
being for the first time under republican rule, must have a far-
sighted revolutionary government for their training. This calls for
[a] period of political tutelage, which is a necessary transitional
ideals and the principles of practical governance. Schiffrin, supra note 12, at 12, 19-20;
see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
145. Sun, supra note 14, at 114.
146. See, e.g., the following discussion of "liberty":
When European democracy was just budding, Europeans talked about fight-
ing for liberty;, when they had gained their end, everyone began to extend
the limits of his individual liberty and soon the excesses of liberty led to
many evil consequences. Therefore [John Stuart] Mill said that only individ-
ual liberty which did not interfere with the liberty of others can be consid-
ered true liberty.... Western scholars had come to realize that [absolute]
liberty was not a sacred thing which could not be encroached upon, but that
it must be put within boundaries.
Sun, supra note 14, at 73-74 (citations omitted). See also Sun's lambasting of the
French Revolution: "The result was that a mob tyranny was instituted... The real
obstructionists [to the progress of democracy] were the believers in absolute democ-
racy." Id. at 100-01.
147. This can be seen most evidently in the Madisonian separation-of-powers struc-
ture of our government and arguments expressing wariness of mob rule, e.g., The
Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
The democratic ideal also had a much more limited connotation throughout much
of United States history, a fact that Sun makes critical reference to. Sun, supra note
14, at 99-100. The franchise in America was originally limited to propertied white
males; the extension of the franchise came about gradually, through such develop-
ments as Jacksonian populism in the 1830s, the Fourteenth Amendment's diminution
of a state's representation for restricting of over-twenty-one male suffrage, and with
the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (female suffrage). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (articulating the principle "one man, one vote").
148. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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stage from monarchy to republicanism. Without this, disorder will
be unavoidable. 4 9
Just as Confucian thought posited that all people were capable of be-
ing educated and becoming virtuous, 50 the people were similarly ca-
pable of being educated and attaining true sovereignty according to
Sunist ideology. Indeed, Confucian morality would guide the
Republic.' 5
While Sun shared with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison a
view that a constitution of separate powers is best suited to a healthy
republic, he did not wish to blindly "parrot" their tripartite schema. 152
Instead, he looked to the Chinese tradition for guidance. In imperial
China, the Emperor monopolized executive, legislative and judicial
149. Sun Yat-sen, Chung-shan ch'aan-shu, Vol. II, Chien-kuo fang-ltleh, Part I,
translated in 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 120-21.
150. See supra part II.A-B. Thtelage, however, was to be limited:
[I]f within ... three years, the Self-Government Commission of a district can
.. get more than half of the population to understand the Three Principles
of the People and pledge allegiance to the republic... the district may also
elect its own officials and become a full-fledged self-governing area ...
When a period of six years expires after the attainment of political stability
throughout the country, the districts... are each entitled to elect one repre-
sentative to form the National Assembly.
Sun Yat-sen, Chung-shan ch'aan-shu, Vol. II, Chien-kuofang-laeh, Part I, translated in
2 Sources, supra note 63, at 118.
151. Consider the following passage:
If today we want to restore the standing of our people ... we must recover
and restore our characteristic, traditional morality .... This characteristic
morality the Chinese people today have still not forgotten. First comes loy-
alty and filial piety, then humanity and love, faithfulness and duty, harmony
and peace. Of these traditional virtues, the Chinese people still speak, but
now, under foreign oppression, we have been invaded by a new culture ....
Men wholly intoxicated by this new culture have thus begun to attack the
traditional morality, saying that with the adoption of the new culture, we no
longer have need of the old morality.... They say that when we formerly
spoke of loyalty, it was loyalty to princes, but now in our democracy there
are no princes, so loyalty is unnecessary and can be dispensed with. This
kind of reasoning is certainly mistaken. In our country princes can be dis-
pensed with, but not loyalty.... Can we, or can we not, make loyalty serve
the nation? If indeed we can no longer speak of loyalty to princes, can we
not, however, speak of loyalty to our people?
Sun Yat-sen, Chung-shan ch'iian-shu, Vol. I, Chien-kuo fang-laieh, Part I, translated in
2 Sources, supra note 63, at 109 (footnote and citation omitted).
These eight virtues are wholly Confucian: "filial piety" is the concept of hsiao;
humanity is jen; yi can be translated as duty or social rightness. Among the classical
sources influencing Sun's moralistic elitism was the essay On Shepherding the People,
or Mu Min. Primarily Confucian in tenor, tradition attributes this short guidebook for
rulers to the 7th-century B.C. statesman K'uan Tzu, although it was likely written
three centuries later. See Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from
Early China 51-52 (W. Allyn Rickett trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1985) (n.d.).
Chiang Kai-shek, despite his relapsing into authoritarian politics, was even more
explicit in his belief that Confucian ethics should guide the Republic of China. 2
Sources, supra note 63, at 134-50. For a discussion of the continuing relevance Con-
fucian ethics can have on modem Taiwan, see Ma, supra note 68, at 675-78.
152. Sun, supra note 14, at 97.
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power, but the traditional system also created an independent cen-
sorate and an independent bureaucracy supervising itself via an exam-
ination system that checked the absolutist impulse.15 3 The censorate
had impeachment functions that in the American system are vested in
the legislature;154 historically, according to Sun, the censorate was able
to rectify abuses.'55 An examination system, testing the examinees in
their knowledge of the Confucian canon, insured an independent,
merit-based bureaucracy thoroughly grounded in the humanistic ide-
als of the great sages. 56
Focusing on the underemphasized Chinese aspects of Sun's republi-
canism should not result in an underestimation of the influence of
Western sources on Sun's political thought. Sun acknowledges that
the germs of modern democracy come from classical Greece and
Rome, 5 17 and praises both the American Revolution and the Civil
War to free the slaves as the "two finest periods in American his-
tory."'58 In addition to adopting rhetoric culled from Lincoln and
American republican theorists,159 as well as discoursing on the distinc-
tions between Hamilton and Jefferson,160 Sun appears comfortable
153. 1d at 147. Sun also distinguished between the five-branch administrative
power of the government and the four-part power of the people consisting of suffrage,
recall, initiative, and referendum. This he likened to a distinction between sover-
eignty and ability: "The people are like the engineer and the government like the
machinery." Id. at 145.
154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cL 5 ( he House of Representatives ... shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.").
155. Sun, supra note 14, at 146-47.
156. Id. at 147.
Recent commentators on the Constitution of the Republic of China have ques-
tioned the need for divorcing censorial powers from the legislative branch, calling the
Control and Examination branches "possibly useless." Edwin A. Wimckler in Consti-
tutional Reform, supra note 87, at 163. Remembering that Nationalism was one of
the Three Principles enunciated by Sun for a China smarting from imperialist abuse,
Sun desired to place his republican movement within the broad stream of Chinese
history and downplay his obvious borrowing of Western ideas. This desire probably
motivated him to include these two possibly redundant branches in his political
system.
It is worthwhile to note that reform-minded bureaucrats of the late Ch'ing period
made the leap to constitutionalism with relative ease:
[Constitutional republicanism... was entirely consonant with the central
values of the 'new-style' bureaucrats who had become dominant in Peking
by 1911. To [them], constitutionalism spelled modernization along Western
lines, and, although the overthrow of the Manchu court was not something
most of them actively favored, they did not balk at it so long as it implied no
challenge to their administrative predominance.
Nathan, supra note 49, at 8.
157. Sun, supra note 14, at 52-53.
158. Id. at 86.
159. See supra note 14.
160. Sun, supra note 14, at 93-95.
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discussing the theories of Rousseau. 161 From the Swiss, Sun borrowed
ideas concerning the rights of initiative and referendum. 62 Yet he
often appears to be trying to distinguish the Western political experi-
ence from that of China, averting his eyes from his more obvious bor-
rowings by criticizing shortcomings in the Western democratic
experience and by adapting distinctly Chinese institutions to his con-
stitutional schema.
D. Constitutional Stillbirths
The years 1912 and 1913 brought a liberal flowering to China.
More than three hundred political parties sprouted, though only about
fifteen were of any significance.' 63 Whereas in 1898 there were only
sixty newspapers and magazines in China, by 1913 the nation had
487.164
The political situation was still fluid, however, and with foreign
wolves at the door, China needed stable leadership. This led to a
drafting of Yuan Shih-k'ai for the presidency. As governor of Shan-
tung province, which was in the German sphere of influence, 165 Yuan
had shown himself capable of curbing both German and Italian ad-
venturism. 66 Sun reluctantly resigned the provisional presidency in
mid-February of 1912 and a government was formed under Yuan's
leadership. 67 In accord with the terms of a provisional constitu-
tion, 68 the country held elections in December 1912 and January
161. Il at 61-63. Commentators have suggested that Chinese republican theorists
were attempting to meld the Mencian tradition with the ideas of Rousseau. Nathan,
supra note 49, at 24-25.
162. Sun, supra note 14, at 106. Sun does not credit the American Populist or Pro-
gressive movements for this inspiration. For a discussion of the contemporaneous
development of initiative and referendum in the American context, see Ellis P.
Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America 391-426 (2d ed. 1911).
163. Young, supra note 27, at 77.
164. Id It should be remembered, however, that a great portion of the population
was illiterate and unaffected by political reform. Socially, the lot of women improved,
as the republicans campaigned against footbinding. In urban areas, the intelligentsia
adopted western garb; throughout the country, men were shorn of queues that had
been a sign of subservience to the Manchus. Only in Szechwan, in the interior, were
there reports of uprisings that sought to restore the Ch'ing dynasty. Id. at 77-80.
165. In 1898 the Germans seized the port city of Tsingtao on Shantung peninsula.
Lest one think this imperialist aggrandizement was totally without benefit to the local
populace, the Germans did bequeath at least one legacy to the inhabitants of this
city-the art of beer brewing. Today the export-quality beer "Tsingtao" comes from
that region. John Byron & Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng 42
(1992).
166. Young, supra note 27, at 53 & n.9, 54.
167. Yuan assumed the provisional presidency on March 10 in Peking. Within a
month the provisional senate likewise moved to Peking. Yearbook, supra note 135, at
665.
168. The infant government promulgated a Sunist fifty-six article constitution on
March 11, 1912. It provided for a bicameral National Assembly consisting of a 274-
member Senate and a 596-member lower house, which first convened on April 8,
1913. 1yau, supra note 125, at 18-19.
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1913. Sun's revolutionary party, rechristened the Kuomintang, 6 9
achieved nationwide success in elections for a two-house assembly,
winning 269 of 596 seats in the lower house.170
Yuan Shih-k'ai's gambit for an autocrat's power was not long in
coming. Sun's partisans found themselves frozen out of the cabinet by
Yuan, so they turned to parliamentary tactics and advocacy of legisla-
tive predominance.'71 A KMT parliamentarian named Sung Chiao-
jen,1 z impatient with Sun's temporizing, sought to constitutionally de-
prive Yuan of power by backing a reform candidate for the regular, as
opposed to provisional, presidency.17 3 An assassin sent by Yuan Shih-
k'ai put an end to this challenge, murdering Sung on March 20,
1913.174
Next, defying the constitution and foregoing legislative approval,
Yuan sought a large foreign loan.175 Cajoling legislators who could be
bought, Yuan compromised the integrity of the Assembly through
bribery. 76 By the summer of 1913, Sun's allies in the provinces were
in open revolt.77 This gave Yuan an excuse to arrest recalcitrant leg-
islators under the color of emergency powers. 78 Thus cowed and
compromised, the National Assembly formally elected Yuan president
on October 6, 1913.'79 On November 4, a presidential mandate un-
169. The T'ung-meng Hui officially became the Kuomintang on August 25, 1912.
Yearbook, supra note 135, at 665.
170. Young, supra note 27, at 114. Until the present-day rebirth of democracy on
Taiwan, see infra part III, these elections had been considered "the only time in Chi-
nese history when a sizable proportion of the population chose its national represent-
atives in a manner we associate with liberal representative government." Young,
supra note 27, at 113. Voters chose electors who would vote for lower house repre-
sentatives, while provincial assemblies chose upper house members. The franchise
was limited to literate males above twenty-one years of age who had at least an ele-
mentary school education or met certain property requirements. Id. at 113-14.
Though Sun himself favored the political equality of women in theory, he bowed to
societal consensus and did not actively champion women's suffrage at this time. Id. at
80.
171. Id. at 85-87.
172. Sung, one of the leading revolutionaries, was a brilliant political organizer who
was largely responsible for the reorganization of the T'ung-meng Hui into the amalga-
mated Kuomintang. He was architect of the KMT's significant victory at the polls in
the winter of 1912-13. Id. at 113-15.
173. Id. at 116-17. The president was to be elected by the National Assembly, in
accord with the provisional constitution. See id.
174. Id. at 117.
175. Id. at 118.
176. Id. at 122.
177. Li Lieh-chun, the governor of Kiangsi, began a revolt on July 12, 1913. Other
republican stalwarts like Hu Han-min, supra note 139, also joined in the struggle
against Yuan Shih-k'ai. Young, supra note 27, at 129-30. Li. a member of the Kuo-
mintang, actually was attempting to implement Sun's Three Stage Revolution at the
provincial level. 2 Sources, supra note 63, at 117.
178. Young, supra note 27, at 122.
179. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 665.
1225
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
seated Kuomintang members of the National Assembly, ending the
necessary quorum and effectively dissolving parliament. s0
Shorn of his antagonists, Yuan still sought to legitimize his regime.
On May 1, 1914, he abolished the provisional constitution, and
promulgated a new sixty-eight article constitution drawn up by his
State Council (Ts'an Chang Yuan). The self-serving charter arrogated
Yuan executive, legislative, and judicial power without specifying any
limit to the "presidential" term.'8 ' Thus ensconced, the bludgeon ap-
peared. Victims of Yuan Shih-k'ai's purges numbered in the
thousands during the first half of 1914.1
In the summer of 1915, supporters of the megalomaniacal Yuan
Shih-k'ai, who had begun to envision himself emperor, published a
theoretical memorandum by a middle-aged American law professor
named Frank J. Goodnow in the Peking Daily News, entitled Monar-
chy or Republic?'83 The piece argued that China's national interest
required aborting its republican experiment and establishing a consti-
tutional monarchy. "It is of course not susceptible of doubt," Good-
now expounded,
that a monarchy is better suited than a republic to China. China's
history and traditions, her social and economic conditions ... all
make it probable that the country would develop that constitutional
government which it must develop if it is to preserve its indepen-
dence as a State, more easily as a monarchy than as a republic.18
Although Goodnow soon after attempted to backpedal from this ap-
parent benison, Yuan's pretensions had been stoked and garbed with
180. Tyau, supra note 125, at 19-20. Contemporaneous with the events described
was a ploy by the republicans to draft a permanent constitution. Article 54 of the
provisional constitution empowered the National Assembly to do so, and thirty men
were thus selected to a Constitution Drafting Committee. Meeting from July 10 to
October 31, 1913, the Committee drafted an alternative constitution. Proposing this
document to a Constitution Conference consisting of both houses on November 3 was
what prompted Yuan Shih-k'ai to effectively dissolve parliament. Id. The many news-
papers that had blossomed in the aftermath of the republican victory were now "cen-
sored, controlled and suspended." Young, supra note 27, at 143.
181. Tyau, supra note 125, at 20.
182. Young, supra note 27, at 143. Yuan Shih-k'ai did not by any means control the
entire nation at this time, and was forced to rely uneasily on local strongmen to ex-
tend his nominal control. One such tough was Chang Hsun, whose marauding
soldiers still wore the queue as a sign of loyalty to the vanquished Manchus (Chang
would actually attempt to restore the old imperial family in the chaotic year of 1917).
At the bidding of Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chang Hsun entered Nanking in September of
1913. Whereas in 1911 "[tjhe revolutionary forces in Nanking had behaved toward
the population in an exemplary manner, keeping discipline and paying for their provi-
sions," Chang's freebooters "pillaged, raped, and burned for two weeks once in the
city." ld at 144.
183. Frank J. Goodnow, Monarchy or Republic?, in The American Image of China
167 (Benson L. Grayson ed., 1979).
184. Id. at 169.
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quasi-legitimacy. 185 All that was left was for the strongman to have
himself elected emperor, which he did on December 12, 1915.11
His ambitions, however, proved short lived, for Yuan died on June
6, 1916. Following his death the republicans resurrected the provi-
sional constitution and the National Assembly reconvened in Septem-
ber. Factionalism soon beset the republican revival, and alternative
power centers vied with each other. A Provisional National Council,
dominated by Peking reactionaries, promulgated a Parliamentary Or-
ganic Law (tsu-chih fa) as well as election laws (hsuan-chii fa) that
reduced parliamentary power, removed the privilege of electing upper
house representatives from KMT-dominated provincial assemblies,
and sharply restricted the popular franchise by increasing voter quali-
fications.1" Sun Yat-sen formed a military government in Canton
during the summer of 1917; elections in 1918 were marred by fraud
perpetrated by the reactionaries that led to the installation of a "Mili-
tarists' Parliament.' 88 These parliamentarians in turn elected Hsu
Shih-chang president in September of 1918. Meanwhile, proponents
of federalism, arguing that the militaristic desire to centralize govern-
ment fueled disunity, advocated granting more power to the prov-
inces, but their proposed panacea was largely ignored.1' 9
185. For a discussion of this incident, see Noel Pugach, Embarrassed Monarchist
Frank J. Goodnow and Constitutional Development in China, 1913-1915, 42 Pac. Hist.
Rev. 499 (1973).
Goodnow served as an advisor to the Chinese government from 1913 to 1914,
before returning to the United States to assume the presidency of Johns Hopkins
University, which he held from 1914 to 1929. Without deigning to mention Goodnow,
Sun Yat-sen issued the following heavy-handed riposte: "Men of the Yuan Shih-k'ai
type argue that the Chinese people, deficient in knowledge, are unfit for republican-
ism. Crude scholars have also maintained that monarchy is necessary." Sun Yat-sen,
Chung-shan ch'aan-shu, VoL II, Chien-kuo fang-laeiz, Part L translated in 2 Sources,
supra note 63, at 120.
186. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 665. Republican and constitutional ideals appar-
ently had made enough of an impression on Yuan that he would seek to legitimize his
ascent to the throne via kangaroo elections and proclaiming himself a constitutional
monarch. Young, supra note 27, at 215-16.
187. Nathan, supra note 49, at 92-93 & n.3.
188. This is the disparaging term used by Kuomintang sources. Yearbook, supra
note 135, at 665. A British observer characterized the 1918 parliamentary elections as
'a veritable orgie [sic] of corruption and rowdyism"; ostensible restrictions imposed
on voter qualifications did not prevent shameless supporters of the various reaction-
ary factions from hiring "beggars, hawkers, fortune-tellers, peasants and such small
fry" to stuff ballot boxes. Nathan, supra note 49, at 96 (quoting Bertram Giles, Nank-
ing Intelligence Report for Quarter Ended July 31, 1918, at 15-23).
189. Nathan, supra note 49, at 5-6. Hunan adopted federalist principles in its pro-
vincial constitution in 1922, id. at 6, but the "federated provinces self-government
movement" died soon after. Fairbank, supra note 64, at 226. Sun himself had flirted
with federalism in 1921, but soon backed away from it to promote national unity.
Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-
1928 at x (1976).
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By 1920, the Republic associated with Sun Yat-sen was effectively
reduced to southwestern China.190 In May of 1921, Sun assumed the
presidency of a government based in Canton; a competing regime held
sway in Peking, led first by Hsu Shih-chang and then by Li Yuan-
hung. The Peking government proclaimed a new constitution in Octo-
ber 1923 to replace the provisional charter of 1912, but without na-
tional unity its affect was limited.191
More significantly for the common Chinese, the death of Yuan
Shih-k'ai had heralded the beginning of the warlordism which was to
buffet China for the next decade, when localized armies' 92 terrorized a
stricken population and the republican torch flickered faintly. Beset
by warlords and foreign powers, Sun cast about for allies. He was
reduced to forming a controversial foreign alliance of convenience
with the equally beleaguered Soviet Union. 93 As a consequence of
this agreement, the Kuomintang formed a united front with the nas-
cent Communist Party. The two parties vowed to work together to
unify the country under a modern government. 94
At this critical juncture, Chiang Kai-shek appeared, a man whose
name would become almost synonymous with "Free China" during
the Second World War and the Cold War.19 5 In 1924, the Sunist gov-
ernment appointed Chiang commandant of the military academy at
Whampoa, where he forged an elite corp of officers trained in modern
techniques of warfare and devoted to the republican cause. The ailing
Sun, who was to die the following year, drew the young officer into
closer confidences, so that at the passing of the Father of the Chinese
Republic, 196 Chiang Kai-shek was able to stake a reasonable claim to
his mantle. Chiang further solidified his ties to Sun's legacy by mar-
rying Soong Mei-ling, the sister of Sun's widow.
Chiang became commander-in-chief of the republican forces in
June of 1926, and then began the great Northern Expedition to quell
the rapacious warlords and unite the nation under the Republic's
190. The five southwestern provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow
and Szechwan refused to recognize the authority of Peking. Nathan, supra note 49, at
92.
191. Id. at 219.
192. See supra note 182.
193. The Sun-Joffe Accord between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China
was signed on January 26, 1923. The reasons for this alliance are summarized in Fair-
bank, supra note 64, at 236-39.
194. The first National Congress of the Kuomintang in Canton agreed to this policy
of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party on January
20, 1924. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 666.
195. This was due in large part to the efforts of Henry Luce and Clare Booth Luce,
whose Time magazine had proclaimed Chiang and his wife "Man and Wife of the
Year" in 1937, speculating that Chiang might one day become "Asia's Man of the
Century." See Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Cen-
tury 4 (1979).
196. Or "kuofu," as many on Taiwan today often call Sun.
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flag."9 The alliance between the KMT and the Communists, initially
characterized by cooperation, began to fray, finally coming into open
warfare after the Northern Expeditionary Force occupied the non-
Concession' 98 portions of Shanghai in 1927. The Communists were
thoroughly routed, and their plans for eventual domination of China
received a substantial setback.99
Despite persistent wrangling among various Kuomintang factions,
prospects for a unified Republic of China brightened when the war-
lord Chang Hsueh-liang of Manchuria pledged allegiance to the na-
tional government in 1930.200 Chiang consolidated his position of
leadership while attempting to establish viable central governmen-
ta 20 ' and ostensibly republican institutions.202 The Kuomintang an-
nounced plans to end by 1935 the period of political tutelage, which
197. The military as well as the political aspects of this campaign are discussed in
Jordan, supra note 189.
198. The foreign powers had divided Shanghai into an open-city International Set-
tlement and into a French sector, with the remainder in the hands of the Chinese.
199. As a result of the decimation of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist leadership, the
Communist initiative turned to the peasant revolutionary Mao Tse-tung. See supra
note 83. Interestingly enough, the Chinese Communist Party had initially viewed Chi-
ang as a leftist within the Kuomintang. So Wai-chor, The Kuomintang Left in the
National Revolution 1924-1931, at 3 (1991).
200. So, supra note 199, at 144. Between May and November of 1930, KMT fac-
tions allied with regional militarists such as Feng Yl-hsiang of north China directly
challenged Chiang's Nanking-based authority in hostilities that pitted up to a million
soldiers against each other. Id. at 139-40. Three warlord generals in Kwangsi prov-
ince along the Indo-China border also challenged the central government in 1929-30.
Thchman, supra note 114, at 132. Such challenges to central authority, while serious,
were not as threatening militarily as one might think, given the tendency of the war-
lords to avoid serious warfare. See Davies, supra note 128, at 97-98 (giving the Ameri-
can diplomat John Paton Davies's eyewitness accounts of "engagements" between
warlords). When faced with a serious military force like that of the Japanese, Chinese
soldiers fared poorly. See infra notes 206-08, 213 and accompanying text.
201. For example, the Central Bank of China was founded on November 3, 1928.
Another historical footnote indicative of the attempt to shoulder the responsibilities
of a central government amid the chaos of internecine struggle was the Republic's
payment of interest on bonds financing the construction of the Hukuang railroad con-
necting Peking with Canton, which had been contracted by the Manchu Government
via Imperial Edict on May 20, 1911. Timely interest payments were made until De-
cember 15,1930, after which time only two half-interest payments were made, one on
June 15, 1937 and another exactly a year later. The Sino-Japanese struggle, see infra
notes 206-08, 213 and accompanying text, effectively diverted whatever intention the
government had of honoring the commitment to the more pressing issue of survival.
Interestingly, these facts led to a district court case which held that the People's Re-
public of China, established in 1949, and not the Republic of China, which exists to-
day on Taiwan and still claims to be the legitimate government of all of China, is the
successor government to the Manchus and hence liable for the acts conducted by its
predecessor. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala.
1982); see also Larry D. Stratton, Comment, Defaulting of Foreign States and an Ex-
pansive Role for the Act of State Doctrine: Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 6
Whittier L. Rev. 177 (1984).
202. A Legislative Yuan along Sunist lines was established on December 5, 1928,
followed by the Examination Yuan on January 6, 1930 and the Control Yuan on Feb-
ruary 16, 1931. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 667.
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had been indefinitely extended amidst the chaos. To that end yet an-
other provisional constitution was promulgated on June 1, 1931. Crit-
ics within the Kuomintang nevertheless maintained that Chiang was
stifling Sun's Principle of Democracy for the purpose of promoting a
personal dictatorship similar to Yuan Shih-kai's.
The question remained whether the foreign powers would idly al-
low a unified China to assert itself. On December 30, 1929, the Re-
public's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the nullification of
counsular extraterritorial jurisdiction. A tired West, drained by the
Great War and mired in economic depression, no longer had its heart
in playing the imperialist game originally spawned by the infelicitous
union of avarice and cultural chauvinism. The United Kingdom re-
sponded positively to China's coming of age, returning the naval base
of Weihaiwei in April 1930.204 The United States reiterated its "Open
Door" Policy in 1932, refusing to recognize other countries' violations
of China's integrity. 5
The Japanese, however, were less demure, and hungrily eyed the
northeastern territory of Manchuria. 6 After engaging the Northern
Expeditionary Forces in 1929 and occupying the city of Tsinan for a
year, they bided their time. Opportunity interjected itself in 1931, and
the Japanese launched an unprovoked surprise attack on the Chinese
203. Wang Ching-wei, the standard-bearer of Kuomintang Left, analogized Chi-
ang's behavior to Yuan's in speeches he gave in March 1931. So, supra note 199, at
185.
Wang Ching-wei offered by far the most significant articulation of democratic prin-
ciples during this period. In a speech before KMT party members on July 3, 1931,
Wang extolled the need to adhere foremost to Sun's Principle of Democracy:
In principle we certainly aim at the realization of all the Three People's Prin-
ciples.... In the politics of today, the elements most ruinous to the country
and to the people are the Communist theory of a single class dictatorship
and Chiang Kai-shek's de facto personal dictatorship. To oppose these we
therefore advocate democracy. Based upon the spirit of the entire Three
People's Principles we advocate implementing democracy first ....
Id. at 106-07.
204. Treaties and Agreements Between the Republic of China and Other Powers,
1929-1954, at 36, 37 (Yin C. Chen ed., 1957).
205. For a discussion of the Open Door Policy, see Fairbank, supra note 64, at 320-
27. The origins of the Open Door Policy, first articulated by the United States in
1899, are discussed in Davies, supra note 128, at 88 (detailing the role an Englishman,
Alfred Hippisley, had in convincing Secretary of State John Hay to adopt a principle
of equal economic opportunity for all nations, a policy which had been abandoned by
the British).
206. The imperialist expansion of Japan at the expense of China was as follows:
The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 had netted them Taiwan and weaned Korea from
China's sphere of influence and into a Japanese orbit (Korea, like Taiwan before it,
became a full-fledged Japanese colony in 1910); the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05
garnered Japan the ports of Liaoyang and Port Arthur; in 1919, the Paris Peace Con-
ference awarded Japan the former German colony of Tsingtao, placing Shantung pe-
ninsula within effective Japanese control. For an analysis of the genesis of Japanese
territorial ambitions, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910
(1960).
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city of Shenyang' 7 on September 18, 1931, quickly overrunning the
northeastern provinces of Kirin and Liaoning. The next month, the
Council of the League of Nations ineffectually exhorted Japan to
leave northeast China by November 16. Japanese naval forces re-
sponded by attacking Shanghai, precipitating the national govern-
ment's flight from Nanking to Loyang. Japan established the puppet
state of Manchukuo in Manchuria, setting up the last Ch'ing emperor
as its quisling. 0 9 The League of Nations refused to recognize this act;
in response, the Japanese stormed out of the ill-starred League in Feb-
ruary 1933.210
Japanese forays into China continued until 1933, at which time Chi-
ang Kai-shek, who briefly had been shuffled out of a position of lead-
ership,211 concluded the Sino-Japanese Tangku Armistice Agreement.
This allowed Chiang to turn his attention to the Communists, who
were amassing power in the rural soviets of Kiangsi province.1 2 Chi-
ang drove the Communists from their Kiangsi lair, but they escaped
north in the famous Long March of 1934. The two Chinese sides,
however, were soon forced into another uneasy alliance: On July 7,
207. Mukden in some sources, for example, Davies, supra note 128, at 28.
208. Though portions of the city-the International and the French Settlements-
were under foreign control, the Chinese districts of the city provided a soft, inviting
target to the Japanese. On January 29, 1932, an aerial bombardment of the Chapei
district killed thousands. Tuchman, supra note 114, at 136. History's first indiscrimi-
nate aerial terror bombing occurred more than five years before the German bom-
bardment of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War; Chapei lacked a Picasso to
memorialize her agony.
209. See Davies, supra note 128, at 176. Bernardo Bertolucci's movie The Last Em-
peror lushly portrays this unfortunate chapter in China's twentieth-century history.
210. The sad train of events that gave lie to lofty internationalist goals, the isola-
tionism fostered by the pinguid Britisher Sir John Simon, and the ineffectiveness of
the League's Lytton Commission, are all narrated in bchman, supra note 114, at 133-
38.
211. Chiang stepped down from his executive position on December 15, 1931, and
the national government was reorganized under a man named Lin Sen on December
28. In mid-March of 1932, however, Chiang became the chairman of the National
Military Council. Yearbook, supra 135, at 667-68.
Except for a few ebbs during which coalitions succeeded in temporarily thwarting
his efforts, from 1932 onward until his death in 1975, Chiang Kai-shek remained the
most powerful man in the Republic of China, regardless of what title he held. He thus
became another name on China's long list of autocrat rulers. In judging him, how-
ever, he concededly entered history at an incredibly trying time for China, beset by
fratricide and invasion. This man who admired Neo-Confucian ethics, see 2 Sources,
supra note 63, at 136-37, could be capable of severe brutality and tolerant of the
venial corruption among his friends and family members that contributed so greatly
to the conditions allowing Communism to rise. See Tuchman, supra note 114, at 321.
If he has left any legacy at all to the emergence of popular sovereignty on Taiwan,
however, it was the two-and-a-half decades of authoritarian stability and attendant
economic prosperity that occurred under his regime.
212. Tuchman, supra note 114, at 131-32. Chiang's emphasis on suppressing Com-
munists while ignoring external threats has been analogized to the behavior of Prince
Regent Kung during the Taiping rebellion, who felt that rebels were a disease of
China's innards, while barbarians only plagued China's limbs. Id. at 138-39.
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1937, Japan staged the infamous Marco Polo Bridge incident as a prel-
ude to an assault on Peking.213 Thus began the Chinese chapter of the
Second World War, two years before Adolf Hitler invaded Poland and
started the conflict in the European theater, a war that included the
brutal Rape of Nanking and the relegation of republican China to a
rump state in the nation's interior.
Chiang's power grew amid a period of nationwide emergency. 214
During this time, democratic practices fell by the wayside out of sheer
necessity of national survival, yet still the republican aspiration re-
mained.215 Even the Allied victory over the Japanese in 1945 could
not be long savored, for the civil war with the Soviet-aided Commu-
nists21 6 resumed almost immediately. Amidst this civil turmoil, the
Republic attempted to construct a new constitution for the day when
China would be at peace.21 7 This document, the Constitution of 1947,
still governs the Republic of China on Taiwan today.
E. The 1947 Constitution and its Suspension
Following the end of World War II, Chiang's Nanking-based gov-
ernment convened a Political Consultative Conference that met from
January 10 to 30, 1946.218 This Conference duly presented a draft con-
stitution to the National Assembly for deliberation; the Assembly
passed the charter on Christmas Day 1946. It went into effect exactly
one year later.21 9
213. The Japanese, claiming that Chinese forces fired upon them, precipitated the
incident to gain control of a railroad bridge at Lukuochiao. The Marco Polo Bridge,
an 800-year-old landmark named after its famous thirteenth-century admirer, ran
alongside the railroad bridge. Tuchman, supra note 114, at 164-65. Cf. Polo, supra
note 93, at 134 (describing the bridge that posterity would associate with him and
expressing his admiration for the civilization that constructed it).
214. The fifth plenary session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang
created a Supreme National Defence Council with Chiang as its chair. Concurrently
he served as President of the Executive Yuan, a body pared of the constitutional legit-
imacy which Sun Yat-sen had envisioned for it. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 669.
215. On May 5, 1936 the government promulgated a draft constitution. Id. at 97.
This draft would form the basis of the 1947 constitution discussed infra part II.E.
Yearbook, supra note 135, at 97.
216. The Soviet Union under Stalin, though nominally an ally of the Republic of
China, invaded Manchuria in the waning days of World War II and supplied the Chi-
nese Communists with arms seized from the surrendering Japanese, fueling in-
ternicine struggle in the hopes of furthering Soviet territorial ambitions at China's
expense. See Davies, supra note 128, at 424-25.
217. See infra notes 218-36 and accompanying text.
218. Hungdah Chiu, Constitutional Development in the Republic of China in Tai-
wan, in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, at 17,
18 & n.1 (Steve Tsang ed., 1993). The Conference worked from the draft constitution
of 1936. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 97.
219. Ironically, the then-Governor-General of Taiwan province, the nefarious Chen
Yi, announced on January 10, 1947 that the new constitution would not apply to Tai-
wan, which needed to be under "tutelage" for a few more years due to its fifty-year
Japanese occupation; post-colonial Taiwan's standard of living at this time was much
higher than that of the rest of China. This helped precipitate the "February 28th
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Given the multipartisan background of the twenty-nine conference
members,22° the result reached was by consensus,"2 though in general
it remained faithful to the vision of Sun Yat-sen.' As such, it pro-
vided for a new National Assembly' whose primary responsibilities
were to elect the president and to amend the constitution. 24 The Na-
tional Assembly sits as a supralegislature, distinct from the Legislative
Yuan,2  which is one of the five branches of the national govern-
ment.2  The other four branches are the Executive Yuan,2 7 Judicial
Yuan,228 Examination Yuan,229 and the Control Yuan.23° Straddling
Incident," discussed infra text accompanying note 247, for which Chen Yi is univer-
sally reviled. George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed 239-40 (1965).
Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen in front of a firing squad on June 16, 1950-not as
punishment for atrocities committed against the Taiwanese people, as Kuomintang
propagandists then asserted, but in punishment for collaboration with the Commu-
nists while governor of Chekiang province, a post he had been promoted to because
of his effectiveness in pacifying Taiwan. Id at 367-68, 396.
220. See Chiu, supra note 218, at 18.
221. This may account for what certain commentators have considered its flaws, in
particular the lack of clarity regarding "the rights and powers of the president and
those of the premier." Hong Yuh-Chin, in Constitutional Reform, supra note 87, at 7.
Such a view posits that the draft constitution was a superior document, as it did not
suffer from such ambiguity. Id
222. Sun's principles are discussed supra part II.C.
223. ROC Const. ch. I.
224. ROC Const. ch. I, art. 27.
225. "The Legislative Yuan shall be the highest legislative organ of the State, to be
constituted of members elected by the people. It shall exercise legislative power on
behalf of the people." ROC Coast. ch. VI, art. 62.
226. This complex system does create confusion, for the National Assembly has no
power to enact legislation other than amendments to the constitution; it is not a legis-
lative house. See, eg., Taiwan: The Outsider, The Economist, July 2, 1994, at 17 (stat-
ing, in error, that the National Assembly is "the second chamber of [Taiwan's]
bicameral parliament"). For a description of the structure of the ROC's government
and the interrelation between the branches, see Yearbook, supra note 135, at 100-22.
227. ROC Const. ch. V. The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of
the state, ROC Const. ch. V, art. 53.
228. ROC Const. cl. VII. The constitution provides for the creation of a Council of
Grand Justices, currently numbering fifteen members, though the constitution merely
mentions "a certain number." ROC Coast. ch. VII, art. 79. The Judicial Yuan is com-
posed of a president and vice president as well as the grand justices; the Council of
Grand Justices interprets the Constitution of the ROC and unifies the interpretation
of laws and ordinances. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 113. Distinct from the Council
of Grand Justices and subordinate to the Judicial Yuan is the Supreme Court, which is
the final court of appeal in criminal and civil cases that do not implicate a constitu-
tional question. Id. at 116.
229. ROC Const. ch. VIII. "The Examination Yuan shall be the highest examina-
tion organ of the State and shall have charge of matters relating to examination, em-
ployment, registration, service rating, scale of salaries, promotion and transfer,
security of tenure, commendation, pecuniary aid in case of death, retirement and old
age pension." ROC Const. ch. VIII, art. 83.
230. ROC Const. ch. IX. The Control Yuan, as a general oversight branch, can
interject itself into the affairs of other governmental branches, both on the central or
local leveL A recent illustration of its power occurred in connection with an August
1994 investigation into allegations of abuse by the Taipei City Police, where three
suspects in a kidnap and murder case were violently interrogated for twenty-four
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the five branches, yet subject to recall by the National Assembly
under the constitution,"' is the president.232
What is significant is the promise of the 1947 Constitution to safe-
guard the sovereignty of the people. Despite the absence of provi-
sions for direct popular election of the president in the original
document, 33 it explicitly stated that "[t]he sovereignty of the Repub-
lic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens." -4 Neverthe-
less, the president holds several trumps that could effectively increase
his power consistent with legislative-branch safeguards. Specifically,
he may declare martial law subject to the approval of or confirmation
by the Legislative Yuan, 35 and he is granted emergency powers sub-
ject to certain checks.236
Such was the system designed to function in normal circumstances.
Normalcy in China in the late 1940s, however, was a state of continu-
ing civil warfare, a fratricidal conflict exacerbated by ideological
forces that attracted the active attention of the United States and the
Soviet Union. The center of power for the non-communist side was
personified in Chiang Kai-shek. Without the formation of institu-
tional alternatives capable of rallying the loyalty of the ravaged citi-
zens of the Republic, Chiang was the only individual to provide a
counterweight to the growing totalitarian menace that appeared to be
in lockstep with the Soviet monolith in those early years of the Cold
War. He was the Generalissimo, an authoritarian strongman who,
ironically, remained the last hope for preserving the vision of the dem-
ocratic and republican heirs of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek was
elected president, with Marshal Li Tsung-jen as vice president, and
inaugurated on May 20, 1948.37
hours prior to arraignment and without notification of their relatives. The Control
Yuan impeached four officers for using "violence, threats, temptation, and cheating"
and three superior officers for nonfeasance. In exercising its investigative powers, the
Control Yuan bypassed the Executive Yuan's prosecutorial office. Taiwan Human
Rights Practices, 1994, U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Mar. 1995, at 1.c.
231. ROC Const. ch. III, art. 27.
232. The office of the president is distinct from that of the Executive Yuan. The
president also can only promulgate laws and issue mandates with the countersignature
of the "President of the Executive Yuan" [i.e. the Premier]. ROC Const. ch. IV, art.
37. In theory this makes the president subject to check by the premier, as exists in
European cabinet systems. Chiu, supra note 218, at 20.
233. Assuming a popularly-elected National Assembly, see infra notes 270-73 and
accompanying text, the body would be broadly analogous to the electoral college in
the United States. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
234. ROC Const. ch. I, art. 2.
235. ROC Const. ch. IV, art. 39; cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. ("[T]he writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.").
236. ROC Const. ch. IV, art. 43. Specifically, the president must present an emer-
gency order to the Legislative Yuan within one month after issuance; the Legislative
Yuan will either confirm the order or withhold confirmation, in which case the orders
cease to be valid. Id.
237. Yearbook, supra note 135, at 672.
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Elections in 1947 and 1948 for delegates to the National Assembly,
the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan brought some hope that
an institutional alternative to Chiang's authoritarianism would arise.
Yet, as the Communist rebellion grew in ferocity and corruption un-
dermined the morale of the Republic, the National Assembly under
Article 174238 of the constitution enacted an amendment intended to
be temporary on April 18, 1948, entitled "Temporary Provisions in
Effect During the Period of Communist Rebellion" ("Temporary Pro-
visions"). 23 9 The Temporary Provisions stated that during the period
of Communist Rebellion, "the president is empowered to adopt emer-
gency measures through a resolution of a cabinet meeting of the Exec-
utive Yuan. The president's power will not be limited by the regular
procedures of Articles 39 and 43 of the constitution." 0
Surveying these events, U.S. Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart, in a
letter to Secretary of State George C. Marshall four days after the
Temporary Provisions went into effect, noted:
The one significant result from the National Assembly was the elec-
tion of [Marshal] Li Tsung-jen despite the determined opposition of
[ ] Generalissimo [Chiang] and his henchmen. Every form of pres-
sure was employed regardless of the promise of free elections, and
President Chiang has lost much face as well as for perhaps the first
time in his experience as Party Leader been unable to assert his Vill.
The rejoicing over this has been wide-spread even within the Gov-
ernment, for Li is generally regarded as the symbol of constructive
reforms.
The supremely important question now is as to whether President
Chiang can welcome Li as his helper in these progressive plans and
himself lead in proclaiming and effecting them, or whether he will
resent Li's triumph .... His treatment of various individuals or
groups who voted for Li-including the two minor parties-is being
interpreted as vindictive .... Personally I still hold to the belief that
[Chiang] wants to do the right thing but is so steeped in the Chinese
tradition of autocratic rule and in his own training and habits...
that he simply does not know how to change.2 41
Hopes that the constitution could thwart the rise of a strongman fell
victim to historical circumstances. The situation worsened on the bat-
238. ROC Const. ch. XIV, art. 174. Critics aver that the constitution grants the
National Assembly the power to amend but not to grant temporary provisions. Hong
Yuh-Chin, in Constitutional Reform, supra note 87, at 6-7.
239. See id. at 5.
240. Id. at 6.
241. Letter from Ambassador . Leighton Stuart to Secretary of State George C.
Marshall (May 14, 1948), in 7 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far
East: China at 233, 233 (U. S. Gov't Printing Off, ed., 1973) [hereinafter Foreign
Relations].
1235
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tlefield; 1949 brought defeat after defeat, forcing the beleaguered Na-
tionalist army to seek refuge in Taiwan.242
From this island outpost, the ROC continued to maintain that it was
the legitimate government of all of China, despite the Communist vic-
tory on the mainland and the founding of the People's Republic of
China ("PRC") on October 1, 1949.43 Taiwan had been a Japanese
colony for half a century, and despite its restoration to Chinese con-
trol in 1945,2 4 the exiled mainlanders viewed the native Taiwanese 24 5
242. On October 25, 1949, the Communists launched an operation against Nation-
alist soldiers holding the offshore island of Kinmen (Quemoy), occupation of which
would be necessary prior to an invasion of Taiwan. On that occasion, Nationalist
forces under Sun Li-jen annihilated the Communists, providing an extremely rare vic-
tory in a year of military disasters. A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist
Takeover 309-10 (1963).
Sun Li-jen, a disciplined, professional soldier and a graduate of Virginia Military
Institute, fought alongside American General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell in
Burma. Tuchman, supra note 114, at 281. He had a high regard for the American
general, of whom he said "no foreigner had ever understood or appreciated the Chi-
nese soldier as had Stilwell." Memorandum of Conversations by Counsel General at
Canton Raymond P. Ludden (Sept. 1-2, 1948), in Foreign Relations, supra note 241, at
446, 446. Sun Li-jen, however, was contemptuous of Chiang Kai-shek and his corrupt
Nanking minions who interfered with military conduct of the Chinese Civil War,
thwarted successful officers of whom they were jealous, and promoted incompetents.
Id. at 446-48. For having crossed both the Generalissimo and his son, Chiang Ching-
kuo, this fine soldier was first cashiered and then placed under house arrest in 1955.
Kerr, supra note 219, at 448.
For the fascinating chronology of events leading to the fall of the Republic of China
on the mainland, as well as background information regarding the Chinese Civil War
of 1945-49, see The China White Paper (Stanford Univ. Press 1967) (1949). For an
understanding of the affect that McCarthyite recriminations over who was responsible
for "losing China" to the Communists had on the career of one State Department
official, see Gary May, China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vin-
cent (1979).
243. The PRC of course claimed that it was the legitimate representative of the
Chinese people, arguing that Taiwan was a renegade province. See Qian, supra note
18. The United States continued to recognize Chiang's ROC government as the legiti-
mate government of all of China until January 1, 1979, when President James E.
Carter derecognized the ROC in favor of the PRC. See discussion infra part III.B.
244. In 1895, the Ch'ing dynasty had ceded Taiwan, or Formosa, to Japan via the
treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the Sino-Japanese War. In 1945, after a fifty-
year occupation, Japan presumably retroceded Taiwan to the Republic of China,
which was then the only government of China. See Kerr, supra note 219, at 26-27.
There is, however, some room for the argument that dejure, as opposed to defacto,
retrocession never occurred. At the Cairo Conference in November, 1943, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, with the acquiescence of Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
reached an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek regarding the future of Taiwan. Herbert
Feis, The China Tangle 106, 108 (1953). The Cairo Statement of December 1st de-
clared that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,
Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." Id. at 108.
The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 subsequently affirmed the Allies's decision that
Taiwan should be granted to China. The question remains, however, whether Taiwan
belonged to the Allies to grant, or whether, like other occupied territories, it should
have been placed under United Nations trusteeship and its people granted the oppor-
tunity to engage in national self-determination. See Kerr, supra note 219, at 25-27.
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with unease, prohibiting the speaking of the Taiwanese dialect 46 and
disbanding political associations. "Unease" at times broke into savage
repression, most notoriously in the aftermath of the "February 28th
Incident" of 1947, which began as a riot over contraband cigarettes
and quickly escalated into a pogrom by mainland Chinese soldiers
against any Taiwanese who were in a position of leadership, from vil-
lage headmen to Japanese-educated lawyers 47
Following the flight to Taiwan, what initially had been envisioned as
a temporary suspension of the constitution became indefinite. In
1954, the National Assembly, based in the "provisional" capital in
Taipei, extended the Temporary Provisions. In addition, the Provi-
sions allowed for the creation of a Garrison Command which enforced
martial law internally.218 Despite the suspended constitution's Article
9 guarantees against the trying of civilians by courts martial, 49 an esti-
mated 10,000 civilians were tried in military courts between 1950 and
1986.250
The present-day opposition Democratic Progressive Party on Taiwan, which is com-
posed primarily of ethnic Taiwanese as opposed to Chinese of mainlander descent,
points out in a recent policy paper that the first post-war treaty on the status of Tai-
wan was the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, whereby Japan surrendered its claim to
Taiwan without saying to whom it surrendered Taiwan. "Taiwan is Taiwan, China is
China". A Practical Basis for a New Cross-Strait Order, Taiwan Communiqud, Sept.
1994, at 12 [hereinafter Taiwan is Taiwan]. The party also stresses that the People's
Republic of China has never exercised control over any of Taiwan's territory, thus
countering Communist China's claim that it is the rightful government of Taiwan. Id.
245. The most important ethnic distinction in contemporary Taiwan is between ex-
iled mainlanders, from sundry provinces, and the Taiwanese, who trace their roots to
Fukien province across the Taiwan Strait. Another important ethnic group is the
Hakka (literally, "Guest Families"), who traditionally maintained a clannish separate-
ness from other Chinese. All these groups are Han Chinese, in distinction to the
indigenous Formosans, who are a Malay-related people and constitute only a small
percentage of the present-day population. These distinctions are discussed in Chen
Chi-lu, People and Culture 1-20 (1987). Modem-day Taiwan explodes the myth that
the Chinese can be seen as a monocultural bloc; for a discussion of efforts to forge a
common identity amidst this hodgepodge, see Thomas B. Gold, Taiwan's Quest for
Identity in the Shadow of China, in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments
in Taiwan Since 1949, at 169 (Steve Tsang ed., 1993).
246. The term "dialect" is misleading. Though China shares a written language, the
spoken tongue varies widely. Taiwanese, a southern Min "dialect" from Fukien, and
Mandarin, a northern Chinese "dialect" which is the national language, are mutually
unintelligible. In contrast, a Spaniard who only speaks Castillian and an Italian who
only speaks Tuscan could easily carry on a detailed conversation, despite "Spanish"
and "Italian" being different languages. See Yearbook, supra 135, at 44. As a wag
once put it, "A language is a dialect with an army."
247. See Kerr, supra note 219, at 291-307, for the heart-rending accounts of the
author, who was a State Department "Formosa Specialist" at the time.
248. The role of the Garrison Command and the effect of martial law on Taiwan are
discussed in John F. Copper, Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic
Promise 11-12 (1990).
249. ROC Const. ch. I, art. 9.
250. Tien, supra note 20, at 13.
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While Taiwan prospered economically, due in part to American aid,
and perhaps more significantly, because of access to the United States
market,2 51 and while certain freedoms like religious exercise flowered,
the regime brooked no toleration of direct challenges to its authority.
The Chiang regime regularly jackbooted attempts at political reform.
In 1960, for example, a circle of reformist mainlander mandarins met
with like-minded local Taiwanese officials under the sponsorship of
Lei Chen, the editor of the fortnightly magazine Free China.2 52 The
group helped found the China Democratic Party on September 4,
1960. The regime saw these modest attempts to have the Republic of
China live up to its democratic ideals as a threat and promptly ar-
rested the organizers." 3
Elections took place for local offices, 54 with voters choosing among
a slate of candidates either endorsed by the Kuomintang or deemed
safe. 5 5 In the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, however,
the delegates elected from the mainland in 1947-48 were frozen in
their seats so as not to compromise the Republic of China's claim to
represent all of China." 6 Chiang Kai-shek turned Taiwan into an is-
land fortress, vowing to return one day to the mainland in victory.2 57
Thus, Taiwan existed in the stagnant political shadow of an authori-
tarian regime for over three decades. Though spared the tumult that
was engulfing mainland China, such as the engineered famines of the
Great Leap Forward or the self-destruction of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the republican constitution lay fallow, the people constrained
from exercising their sovereignty.2 8
251. See Kwoh-ting Li, Economic Transformation of Taiwan, ROC 161-63 (1988).
252. Kerr, supra note 219, at 446.
253. Id. at 447-48.
254. Martin L. Lasater, A Step Toward Democracy: The December 1989 Elections
in Taiwan, Republic of China 10 (1990) (listing elections for county magistrates, pro-
vincial assemblymen and other local officials that took place between 1951 and 1985
at regular intervals).
255. See Copper, supra note 11, at 46-47. The Democratic Socialist Party and the
Young China Party, two minor organizations, fled the Communists with the Kuomin-
tang in 1949. A sense of their subservient roles in helping Chiang Kai-shek maintain a
pluralistic facade during the chilly decades of ideological competition with the main-
land can be gleaned from China Yearbook 1969-70, at 90-94 (China Publishing Co.
1970).
256. See Copper, supra note 11, at 48-50. Supplemental elections began to be held
in 1969 to fill vacancies and to increase Taiwanese participation. See Lasater, supra
note 254, at 11. These bodies remained the rubber-stamp domains of gerontocrats up
through the 1980s. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
257. See, for example, President Chiang Kai-shek's national address of October 10,
1961: "Our driving force stems from our sacred duty of recovering the Chinese main-
land, eliminating Communism and delivering our compatriots from their bondage."
China Yearbook 1961-62, at 977 (China Publishing Co. 1962). As time went on, this
scenario became increasingly unlikely, though the government continued to profess
its desire to eventually recapture the mainland. Copper, supra note 11, at 49.
258. Copper describes the situation during this period as follows:
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Im. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF THE 1990s
AND THE GROUNDWORK FOR FULL DEMOCRATIC
SOVEREIGNTY
The following section examines the breathtaking reform under-
taken by the ROC's current president, Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui,
asking whether it leads to the fulfillment of a tradition of democratic
sovereignty. Consistent with the earlier emphasis on the classical
Confucian roots of the concept, this Note argues that the reforms of
the Lee era do not mark a radical break from the past, but rather the
fruition of ideals of democratic sovereignty implicit in traditional Chi-
nese notions. Just as Edmund Burke saw in conservative reform the
regeneration of "the deficient part of the old constitution through the
parts which were not impaired," 9 the present generation on Taiwan
harks back to Confucius and Mencius through Sun Yat-sen.
A. Basic Framework of Reform
When the son of the late Generalissimo died on January 13, 1988,
progressives mourned. Chiang Ching-kuo, who at his father's behest
had recalibrated the ever-staunchly anti-Communist Kuomintang
along Leninist organizational lines in the 1950s, had ended his career
as a true reformer. 60 As a mainlander and the son of the Generalis-
simo, this enlightened autocrat increased the "Taiwanization" of the
Kuomintang in the 1970s,261 and was sufficiently confident of his grip
on power to name a native Taiwanese agronomist, Lee Teng-hui, as his
[T]he political system of the Republic of China... was democratic in struc-
ture and in most senses democratic in spirit. But as the system operated it
was more authoritarian than democratic. Also there was a gap between the
level of participation and the way the political system worked at the local
level as compared to the national leveL... [Tihe central government, rather
than being a model of democracy that trained the population for future dem-
ocratic politics, had the opposite effect; it impeded or at least stalled the
development of participatory democracy.
Copper, supra note 11, at 20.
259. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 33 (Anchor Books
1973) (1790).
260. There is irony in this, as his father had placed the younger Chiang in charge of
internal security on Taiwan after the loss of the mainland, a role he performed with
ruthless relish. He played a key role in eliminating the political voice of the reform-
ists around Lei Chen in 1960. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53. His machia-
vellian modus operandi as security chief is detailed in Kerr, supra note 219, at 445-50.
261. See Parris H. Chang, The Changing Nature of Taiwan's Politics, in Taiwan: Be-
yond the Economic Miracle, supra note 20, at 25, 32-34. In 1972 as Premier, or head
of the Executive Yuan, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed native Taiwanese to the vice
premiership and governorship of Taiwan province. By 1987, 14 of 31 members of the
KMT Standing Committee were Taiwan natives. Id at 32.
The Kuomintang functions as follows: The National Congress, meeting every four
years or so, is the supreme organ of the Kuomintang. When the National Congress is
not convened, the Central Committee governs the Party, meeting every year in a ple-
nary session. The Central Standing Committee-traditionally chaired by the ROC's
president-meets weekly and oversees daily activities. Lasater, supra note 254, at 6-7.
1995] 1239
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
vice president.262 Chiang not only had the foresight, but also the polit-
ical will and-perhaps most importantly in a militarist state with a
quasi-Leninist ruling party-the political capital to effect far-reaching
changes. Preeminent among the changes was his decision to lift mar-
tial law on July 15, 1987, effectively legitimizing the opposition Demo-
cratic Progressive Party ("DPP") which had been formed in violation
of existing laws on December 28, 1986.263 Chiang, however, saved his
biggest announcement for Christmas Day 1987: advocacy of full elec-
tions for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.2
When Lee Teng-hui first took the oath of office he had inherited a
strongman system, but he was not a strongman.2 65 He soldiered on
with Chiang Ching-kuo's reforms under the watchful eye of the old
guard mainlander elite.266 After cautiously laying the groundwork,267
on May 1, 1991 he announced the termination of the Period of Com-
munist Rebellion, while the National Assembly simultaneously an-
nounced the repeal of the Temporary Provisions and the adoption of
ten new articles to the constitution. 68 The latter reform represented
an exceptionally bold step away from the past, for the Kuomintang
government had said that it would never revise the text until its recov-
ery of the mainland.269
262. Maria Shao, Rise of a Native Taiwanese Politician Signals Power-Sharing by
Ruling Party, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 34.
263. Chiu, supra note 218, at 32.
264. Id.
265. Edwin A. W'mckler, in Constitutional Reform, supra note 87, at 15-16.
266. Speculation was rife that General Chiang Wei-kuo, Ching-kuo's younger
brother, would remain the power behind the throne. While the military provided
Chiang Wei-kuo with a base of support, the late president's statement that no member
of the Chiang family would succeed him appeared to undercut any ambitions the sur-
viving members of the Chiang family may have had. See David Holley, Taiwan Looks
for New Era After Chiang: Collective Rule May Enhance Democracy, L.A. Times,
Feb. 8, 1988, at 4. For a discussion of the tightrope Lee had to walk early in his
presidency, see Jeff Hoffman, Taiwan: The Struggle to Shake Off Authoritarian Rule,
S. China Morning Post, Dec. 29, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE
File.
267. Lee's election as Chairman of the Kuomintang at the party's Thirteenth Na-
tional Congress on July 8, 1988 was a significant step, especially since the Taiwanese
Lee won the muted endorsement of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. David Holley, Tai-
wan's President Elected Ruling Party Leader, L.A. Tunes, July 9, 1988, at 12. One
week later, President Lee replaced more than a third of the Kuomintang's 180-mem-
ber Central Standing Committee with younger reformists. David Holley, Reformist
Members Named to Taiwan Party Leadership, L.A. Times, Jul. 15, 1988, at 13.
268. See President Lee Declares an End to Mobilization Period, Reuter Textline,
May 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE File.
269. Yeh Jiunn-Rong, Changing Forces of Constitutional and Regulatory Reform in
Taiwan, 4 J. Chinese L. 83, 88 (1990) (noting that "not amending the Constitution
became the national policy, and suggesting constitutional revision became political
taboo").
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The next major step was fully competitive elections for the National
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan.270 One problem in democratizing
these two institutions had been the presence of the aging parliamen-
tarians who had not faced a competitive election since the late
1940s.271 In 1991, however, the Judicial Yuan's Council of Grand Jus-
tices issued Interpretation No. 261, reversing its previous rulings and
ordering the gerontocrats to retire by the end of the year.272 Thus on
December 21, 1991, elections were held for the National Assembly 73
followed by balloting for Legislative Yuan seats the next year.274
With the democratization of the parliamentary bodies, the presi-
dency remained the one major non-democratic bastion. As student
demonstrators protested in favor of direct popular election of the
president at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall-Taipei's closest
equivalent to Tiananmen Square in Peking-President Lee boldly
called for a National Affairs Conference from June 28 to July 3, 1990
to represent the diverse viewpoints on constitutional reform, in partic-
ular regarding direct election of the president. Leading dissidents, in-
cluding one independence activist who had been released from prison
just one month previously, attended this extraconstitutional confer-
ence. 275 As to his own views, President Lee remained reticent until
the spring of 1992, when he expressed support for direct democracyV76
On July 28, 1994, Taiwan's National Assembly voted to amend the
constitution to allow for direct presidential elections at the end of Lee
Teng-hui's six-year presidential term, set to expire in 1996.277 The
270. Taiwan held elections for a significant number of Legislative Yuan seats on
December 2, 1989; though significant, representatives elected on the mainland contin-
ued to hold 166 of 296 seats. Lasater, supra note 254, at 23.
271. In early 1990, 632 of the 2961 members of the National Assembly and 144 of
760 Legislators originally elected were still alive and attending to their political duties.
Tien, supra note 20, at 7.
272. Hong Yuh-Chin, in Constitutional Reform, supra note 87, at 8. The Council of
Grand Justices is discussed supra note 228.
273. David Holley, Taiwan to Rejuvenate Assembly, LA. Tunes, Dec. 21, 1991, at
A16.
274. See John F. Copper, Taiwan's 1991 and 1992 Non-Supplemental Elections:
Reaching a Higher State of Democracy 45-69 (1994) (analyzing the 1991 and 1992
elections).
275. Famous Taiwan Dissidents Invited to Political Conference, Reuters Textline,
June 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE File.
276. Willy Wo-lap Lam, Leader Backs Direct Vote S. China Morning Post, Mar. 7,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE File.
277. ROC Const. art. 2, as amended Aug. 1, 1994; Jane Macartney, Taiwan Assem-
bly Approves Direct Presidential Poll, Reuter, July 29, 1994, available in WESTLAV,
Int-News. The National Assembly also decided to allow overseas Chinese the right to
vote in the election and to expand the president's power by taking away the premier's
power to veto senior personnel nominations made by the Chief Executive. See Na-
tional Assembly Passes Controversial Constitutional Reform Package, Bbc Monitoring
Service, Aug. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Int-News. Additionally, the presiden-
tial term will be shortened from six years to four. Taiwan President Seeks Reelection,
Party Set to Split, Japan Econ. Newswire, Aug. 23, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
Farnews.
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election has been set for March 23, 1996, marking the first time the
people of a Chinese polity have chosen their head of state directly2 78
While unprecedented, this event is not incongruous with a Chinese
political tradition rooted in Mencius and fostered by Sun; rather it
fulfills this tradition.
As the 1996 presidential balloting nears, two interesting debates
concerning democracy have emerged, the first involving intraparty de-
mocracy within the Kuomintang. Former KMT Vice-Chairman Lin
Yang-kang, a native Taiwanese who has announced he intends to chal-
lenge Lee for the presidency, had called for allowing the approxi-
mately 2.5 million KMT party members to vote for a candidate.279
Instead, the roughly two thousand delegates to the Second Plenary
Session of the Party's Fourteenth Congress held in August 1995 alone
voted, renominating Lee Teng-hui and precipitating a division in the
party.2 0
A second debate concerns whether presidential candidates will have
to meet minimum education standards.28' KMT Organizational Af-
fairs Department Director Chang Cheng-ching is a proponent of such
standards, while the populist DPP, through its secretary general Su
Tseng-chang, is vehemently opposed to the elitist notion.2s The Kuo-
mintang view harkens back to Sun's concept of tutelage under a revo-
lutionary elite,283 which in turn echoes the Confucian concept of
278. See Alice Lee, First Presidential Elections: No Scarcity of Talent Here, China
News, Oct. 10, 1995, at 22.
279. Lin Wants Entire Party to Vote for KMT Presidential Candidate, China News,
Feb. 24, 1995, at 2.
280. Chiang Chung-ming, Tang Tai Piao Piao Hsuan Pu Fu Ming Chu Yuan Tse-
Lin Yang-kang Ch'iang Tao Pu Kung Ping Chiu T'ui Chu [Delegates' Vote Undemo°
cratic-Lin Yang-kang Emphasizes If Its Not Fair, He'll Withdraw], World J., Aug. 22,
1995, at A12. Lin vehemently criticized the undemocratic selection process. Id.
Previously, a former premier and a leader of the mainlander-dominated "Old
Guard" of the KMT, Hau Pei-tsun, offered a more detailed critique of the lack of
intraparty democracy. Hsieh Chung-liang, Hau Pei-tsun Hsiang Fa Chi San Hsiang
Yun Tong Lai Chieh Chiu Wu Ta Wei Chi [Hau Pei-tsun Would Like to Start "Three
Movements" to Save Taiwan from "Five Threats"], The Journalist, Dec. 12, 1993, at 19-
21. In addition to intraparty democracy, Hau advocated preservation of the existing
constitutional structure with the premier retaining actual power, as well as mainte-
nance of the ROC's identity instead of an independent Taiwan status-the "Three
Movements." He further articulated what he saw as the "Five Threats": (i) the Dem-
ocratic Progressive Party's advocacy of Taiwanese independence; (ii) the disappear-
ance of the "one China" policy; (iii) conflict between native Taiwanese and those of
mainland extraction; (iv) lack of devotion to the Three Principles of the People; and
(v) abandonment of the five branch division of governmental power in favor of a
presidential autocracy. Id.; see also discussion infra notes 296-301 and accompanying
text.
281. Education Criteria for Candidates Debated, China News, Feb. 20, 1995, at 3.
President Lee holds a doctorate from the United States, as do many Cabinet officials.
Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 641242
1995] CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON TAIWAN
morally superior chan-tzu leading the people. s8 The DPP maintains
that the KMT maneuver crassly attempts to forestall future contend-
ers for the presidency, such as DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh, who
does not meet the proposed educational criteria.2s
B. Who are the Sovereign People of the Republic of China on
Taiwan?
In a July 5, 1994 White Paper, the Kuomintang government an-
nounced a nuanced revision of the party's traditional "one China"
policy: From now on, the Republic of China "would no longer com-
pete with Beijing for the 'right to represent China' in the international
arena." 6 Instead, it acknowledges as fact that "China" comprises
"two political entities;" this, the government emphatically points out,
is not intended to mean that there are "two Chinas." s7
Because this policy can be construed to mean that Taiwan has ac-
quiesced to the mainland's claim to be the sovereign representative of
the Chinese people,2ss the question then arises: Who are the sover-
eign people being enfranchised by the ongoing democratization on
Taiwan? Although the eligible electorate has not been limited solely
to people within Taiwan proper or the offshore islands controlled by
the Republic of China,m the issuance of the White Paper, coupled
with the mandatory retirement of old legislators initially elected in
1947 and 1948 from mainland districts29 as well as certain comments
made by Lee Teng-hui, 91 has raised the question of whether the Re-
public of China would seek international recognition as a democratic
nation of Taiwan. At present, the island nation is seeking readmission
284. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
285. Susan Yu, Bill to Regulate First Presidential Election Under Review, Free China
J., Jan. 20, 1995, at 1.
286. Frank Ching, An About-turn by Taiwan, Far E. Econ. Rev., Aug. 4, 1994, at 30.
287. Id.
288. See supra note 243.
289. The most important of the offshore islands are two pimples on the rump of
China, Kinmen and Matsu. Others eligible to participate in the Republic of China's
elections include overseas Chinese, provided they register to vote and have lived on
the island for four consecutive months. Poll Sign-up Date Set for Overseas Chines
China News, Oct. 4, 1995, at 2.
290. See supra notes 272 and accompanying text. Of the 325 Assembly seats, the
reform allots 225 to local districts on Taiwan; 80 are nationwide seats, while the re-
maining 20 are distributed to overseas Chinese delegates through the parties based on
the proportion to the total vote each party receives. David Holley, Taiwan to Rejuve-
nate Assembly, L.A. Tunes, Dec. 21, 1991, at A16.
291. For example, certain remarks purportedly made to a Japanese journalist pub-
lished in the Asahi Weekly indicate that Lee-a devout Presbyterian-envisions him-
self as a "Moses" leading the Taiwanese people out of "Egypt" and into a "Promised
Land." Lee also discussed the oppression of ethnic Taiwanese by an "alien regime"
that fled the mainland in 1949, as well as the climate of fear which prevented
Taiwanese from speaking their native tongue as opposed to Mandarin in the 1950s
and beyond. President Lee Has a Change of Heart-Gradually, Taiwan Communique,
Sept. 1994, at 16-17.
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to the United Nations2' under its official title against the strenuous
opposition of the People's Republic on the mainland,293 as well as ac-
cession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
and its successor entity, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
under the rubric "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs
Territory. 2
94
The opposition Democratic Progressive Party was quick with a re-
joinder to the KMT gambit to shift the terms of the debate contained
in the White Paper. A nine-page statement issued on August 2, 1994,
declared that "[the] ultimate basis for a state's sovereignty is popular
consent. 2 95 Appealing to those portions of the United Nations Char-
ter that speak to the principle of "self-determination, 2 96 the declara-
tion continued: "No person or government shall be permitted to
decide Taiwan's future without the consent of its people. The DPP
advocates defining the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty in accordance
with international law and the principle of self-determination." 97
292. See Lien, supra note 18, at 636.
293. Until American geopolitical interest began to shift in the wake of the Sino-
Soviet split of the 1960s, the Republic of China on Taiwan held the United Nations
China seat. See Richard Nixon, The Real War 134-36 (1980) (discussing the Sino-
Soviet split and its affect on American strategic thinking). On October 25, 1971,
shorn of U.S. support, the United Nations expelled the ROC. Resolution on Represen-
tation of China, G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/8439 (1971); see also James C. H. Shen, The U.S. and Free China: How the
U.S. Sold Out Its Ally 59-64 (1983) (giving the viewpoint of the ROC's diplomatic
establishment).
294. The ROC was one of the original contracting parties to GAIT, signing both
the Final Act, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, and the Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion ("PPA") of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 308, 313. On March 6, 1950, the ROC gave the Secretary General of the
United Nations the sixty-day notice required by Article 5 of the PPA that it planned
to withdraw from GATT, presumably because it had lost control of the mainland and
did not want to be held responsible for the entire customs territory of China. Ya Qin,
China and GATT. Accession Instead of Resumption, 27 J. World Trade, Apr., 1993, at
77, 79 & n.13 (1993). In 1965, GATT granted the ROC observer status, which it lost
in 1971 when it was expelled from the United Nations and "all the organizations re-
lated to it." Id. at 80 & n.19 (noting GATT policy to follow the decisions of the United
Nations on political matters).
In 1990, Taiwan applied for GATT membership as a customs territory. Interna-
tional Law, supra note 113, at 499. As GATT membership entitles a member to be-
come a founding member of the WTO, Taiwan seeks to enter GATT as a means of
gaining acceptance to the WTO. Bilateral Agreements in GATT Talks Reached with
Four Nations, Reuter Textline, Feb. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
CURNWS File. As of January 31, 1995, both organizations had only granted Taiwan
observer status. Week in Review, Free China J., Feb. 10, 1995, at 1.
295. Taiwan is Taiwan, supra note 244, at 11.
296. U.N. Charter arts. 1 & 55; see supra note 243.
297. Taiwan is Taiwan, supra note 244, at 11.
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The ability of the DPP to win competitive elections, 98 coupled with
their refusal to disavow the cause of Taiwanese independence, 9
raises the possibility of the future election of a president committed to
dismantling the Republic of China in favor of an independent nation
of Taiwan. It would be ironic if the democratization born within the
context of the ROC's constitutional framework resulted in the knell of
the Republic. Thus at the moment of the apparent victory of the Sun
Yat-sen's Principle of Democracy, it is possible that his Principle of
Nationalism, with its view of a united China, may slip further away
from realization.300
C. Limitations to the Sovereignty of the People
Other hurdles remain before realizing the people's dignified as-
sumption of sovereignty, some of which come from the people them-
selves. The foreign media has shown pictures illustrating the growing
pains of democracy, which have sometimes included acts of mob vio-
lence.30 1 Muckrakers have alleged massive vote buying, especially on
behalf of Kuomintang candidates,3° and the involvement of under-
world figures in political campaigns. 03 Politicians, particularly those
in the opposition, have turned the august Legislative Yuan and Na-
tional Assembly into pugilists dens.3°
DPP members counter that parliamentary violence is provoked by
the Kuomintang's high-handed, anti-democratic tactics. One incident
occurred on December 30, 1993, when a female opposition member
walloped the deputy speaker of the Legislative Yuan, a KMT member,
with a pink trash can.3"' At issue was a KMT decision to ramrod
three bills through the legislature in violation of parliamentary
298. For example, in the December 1994, voters in Taipei chose DPP candidate
Chen Shui-bian as mayor of the ROC's provisional capital. Stephanie Low & Christo-
pher Bodeen, Chen Picked as Taipei Mayor, China Post. Dec. 4, 1994, at 12.
299. Taiwan's Opposition Party Retains Independence Plank, Dow Jones Int'l News,
Mar. 18, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Farnews (reporting decision by 276 delegates
at a DPP conference discussing the party's platform to retain the call for a referen-
dum on the issue of independence).
300. Mainland China has threatened to "shed blood" if Taiwan ever were to declare
official independence, thus providing an incentive for Taiwanese voters to maintain
the status quo, even if it leaves issues like the international status of Taiwan un-
resolved. See China Warns Taiwan Against Independence Move, Reuter Textline, Oct.
30, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE File (reporting PRC Politburo
member Li Ruihuan's remarks).
301. Jeremy Mark & Marcus W. Brauchli, Taiwan Faces Violence Linked to Talks
With China, Closing of Pirate Stations, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1994, at A8.
302. Snel & Tozzi, supra note 21, at 10-11 (reporting allegations by former Finance
Minister Wang Chien-shien and DPP legislator Tsai Shih-yuan).
303. Julian Baum, Mob Rule: Organized Crime Pushes into Politics, Far E. Econ.
Rev., Feb. 2, 1995, at 22.
304. See e.g., Andrew Quinn, Speaker of Taiwan Floored in Latest Fighting, Reuter,
Apr. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTFE File.
305. Julian Baum, Breaking the Rules: Parliamentary Row Over Burgeoning Pres-
idential Power, Far E. Econ. Rev., Jan. 20, 1994, at 14.
1245
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
rules.3 °6 More objectionable, however, was President Lee's eager
signing of the bills within hours of their passing.30 7
Such behavior by the still-popular Lee raises eyebrows. The three
bills allowed the continued existence of two national security agencies
as well as a presidential personnel organization that fall under the
president's purview.308 This amounts to a substantial delegation of
power to the presidency, which, according to constitutional expert Hu
Fu of National Taiwan University, threatens the delicate balance of
power outlined in the constitution: "We basically have a parliamen-
tary system. Yet the president is accumulating a lot of power and he's
not responsible to the legislature. ' 309 Hu Fu does not want to see the
power of the president expand at the expense of the Executive Yuan,
voicing concern that the emergence of a president lacking accountabil-
ity could lead to the future emergence of a "Latin American-style
strongman. ' '310 With a popularly-elected president in March 1996,
more power will likely accrue to the office.
Yet such prognostications may be unduly alarmist. If the power of
the presidency increases relative to that of the premiership after the
1996 elections, it may be a natural outgrowth from the fact that he will
have been directly elected by popular vote, hence vesting the occu-
pant of the office with greater perception of authority.311 Significant
306. Id. Specifically, the deputy speaker denied opponents their rightful filibuster
and did not hold the requisite second and third readings of the bills. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. The two national security agencies, the National Security Council and the
National Security Bureau, have a checkered history. Under Chiang Kai-shek, the for-
mer overrode Legislative and Executive Yuan decisions while the latter allegedly
served as a presidential spy agency. They operated without explicit legal authoriza-
tion for over a decade before an emergency decree legitimized them in 1968. In 1991,
when President Lee ended the Period of Communist Rebellion, see supra text accom-
panying note 268, the National Assembly passed a special amendment extending the
organizations until the end of 1993-thus accounting for the brazen, eleventh-hour
maneuvering by the Kuomintang. Baum, supra note 305, at 14.
309. Baum, supra note 305, at 14. Hu adds that it would require more than consti-
tutional revisions to make the president accountable, perhaps destroying the Republic
of China's nuanced five-branch government. Id.
310. Wu Ru-ping, Hu Fu Ts'eng Shih Hau Pei-tsun te Hsien Fa "Lao Shih" [Hu Fu
was Hau Pei-tsun's Former Constitutional Law "Teacher"], The Journalist, Dec. 12,
1993, at 16.
Hu's concerns have been seconded by Hau Pei-tsun, a gruff ex-general and former
premier whom Lee had replaced with the more pliable current premier. Huang
Kuang-chin, Hau Pei-tsun Tu Ch'ang Pi Kung Chan Tou Ke Lee Teng-hui Han Jan
Hua Hsia Hsiu Chih Fu [Hau Pei-tsun Flies Solo, Lee Teng-hui Shoots Him Down],
The Journalist, Dec. 12, 1993, at 12; see also supra note 280. Article 55 gives the
president authority to nominate and appoint the premier subject to legislative con-
sent. ROC Const. ch. V, art. 55.
311. Such were the gist of observations made by Lien Chan, the current premier,
who nevertheless foresaw the continued relevance of the premiership, as its adminis-
trative functions are delegated by the constitution. Wei Lai Ke K'uei Lien Chan Shuo
Pu Hui Jo Shih [Lien Chan Says, the Premier's Power Won't be Weakened], World J.,
Sept. 8, 1995, at A12.
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signs of improvement give grounds for overall optimism that demo-
cratic practices are taking strong enough root to forestall any return to
authoritarianism.
Other political figures, for example, are being held accountable for
their actions. One particularly egregious act of mob political rioting
from the December 1994 election cycle has resulted in the sentencing
of eighteen people for hooliganism, including two DPP National As-
semblymen .3 1  Four Kuomintang legislators who voted in favor of a
nuclear power plant in their home districts faced a recall campaign by
their constituents in accordance with the constitution.313 While the
effort failed to garner a high enough percentage of registered voters to
effect a recall,314 it marked the first time in the constitutional history
of the Republic of China that this right has been exercised.3 15 Thus
despite flaws, the constitution appears to be working, effecting a
largely indigenous notion of popular sovereignty that has its roots
outside the Western world.
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF A CHINESE NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC
SOVEREIGNTY AND A CHINESE CONsTrrUTIONAtISM
The most obvious ramifications of Taiwan's as-yet-incomplete
emergence as a constitutional democracy is the model it creates for
mainland China.316 Never before in history has a Chinese head of
state been directly selected by the people. While the present situation
on mainland China does not bode well for the immediate emergence
of constitutional democracy,31 7 Taiwan's progression cannot go unno-
ticed across the Strait.
312. 18 Sentenced for Part in Melee at New Party Rally in Kaohsiung, China News,
Feb. 26, 1995, at 3.
313. ROC Const. ch. II, art. 17.
314. Only 21% of Local Voters Cast Ballots in Anti-Lungmen Recall, Nucleonics
Wk., Dec. 1, 1994, at 5.
315. Taiwan Opposition County to Recall Rival Legislators, Reuter, Oct. 17, 1994,
available in Lexis, Nexis Library, TXTFE File.
316. See One China, Plus Democracy, N.Y. Tmes, Dec. 30, 1992, at A14.
317. Critics of the mainland's continued aversion to democracy point to meddling
in Hong Kong's internal affairs, despite having promised to respect a "high degree of
autonomy" for 50 years after taking the crown colony over in 1997. Most significant is
the People's Republic's refusal to continue to recognize the results of elections in
Hong Kong after sovereignty reverts to China. In First Free Vot4 Anti.China Forces
Win in Hong Kong, N.Y. Tmes, Sept. 19, 1994, at All (reporting that the PRC gov-
ernment news agency, Xinhua, reiterated China's intent to scrap the results of elec-
tions after 1997); see also Frank Ching, China Reneges on Hong Kong, Far E. Econ.
Rev., Feb. 16, 1995, at 31 (criticizing China's request for confidential files of civil
servants as contrary to the spirit of 1984's Sino-British Joint Declaration as well as
Hong Kong's Basic Law, which will serve as a constitution after 1997).
Optimists might point, however, to the petitioning of the National People's Con-
gress, the nation's parliament, by a group of dissidents arguing that alleged human
rights abuses be rectified. Among the signers of the petition is Wang Dan, who was
predominant in the Tiananmen Square student demonstrations of 1989. Patrick E.
Tyler, In Beijing, Dissidents File New Petitions, N.Y. Tmes, Feb. 28, 1995, at A8; see
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President Lee Teng-hui is certainly aware of the example a demo-
cratic Taiwan could set for mainland China. Responding to observa-
tions that a rise in a sense of autonomy among local governments on
the mainland 318 may be due in part to Taiwan's experiments in ex-
tending local self-government,319 President Lee has remarked:
[The] rise of the sense of autonomy among local governments [on
the mainland] not only presages that the people want to be their
own masters but also marks the beginning of the decline of the cen-
tralized totalitarian authority. Democratic politics is local politics
.... We should let more influential mainland thinkers come to see
Taiwan, especially Taiwan's rural areas.320
The significance of direct popular election of a president in a Chinese
political entity321 cannot be overstated. Even if the ROC were to
evolve into an independent nation of "Taiwan," it still would be cul-
turally Chinese, much as Austria is German while at the same time
being a nation independent of Germany.322 Thus, it could still serve
also Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in
the Deng Xiaoping Era (1994) (seeing the emergence of a grassroots democratic
movement despite the ruling elite's intransigence).
318. This is most notable in the rich coastal provinces of southern China like
Kwangtung and Fukien. See Gerald Segal, Beijing's Fading Clout, N.Y. Times, May
25, 1994, at A21 ("Beijing pretends to rule the provinces, and the provinces pretend to
be ruled by Beijing."). This trend was only temporarily checked by the crackdown at
Tiananmen Square and subsequent attempts by the center to reassert itself. See
Nicholas D. Kristoff, From China's Provinces, Rare Voice of Dissent, N.Y. Tunes, Nov.
12, 1990, at A5 (reporting that "even the governors of minor provinces were report-
edly outspoken and critical of the national government").
One fiscal reason for the assertion of parochial independence may be due to a tax
system which leaves money in the provinces. James McGregor, China's Backward-
Flowing Tax System Leaves Beijing Up the Budgetary Creek, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1990,
at All.
319. The elections of December 3, 1994, represented the first truly competitive
elections for the mayorships of Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as for the governor of
Taiwan Province. The exile of the government claiming to represent all of China to
the nation's smallest province and a handful of offshore islands has led to a layer-cake
effect of a national governmental structure sitting atop a provincial structure. Law
professor Hu Fu of National Taiwan University has remarked that overlapping man-
dates may cause friction between the president and the provincial governor, as they
would be elected by the same constituency. Alice Hung, Taiwan to Hold First Presi-
dential Poll Next March, Reuters, Feb. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
CURNWS File.
320. Lee Teng-hui, Serve the People of this Land to Rejuvenate the Chinese Nation
14 (China Times interview published in pamphlet form Nov. 16, 1993).
321. This awkward term would include not only the ROC and PRC or imperial
China, but also overwhelmingly Chinese Singapore, Hong Kong, and Macao. The
British colony of Hong Kong is to revert to mainland Chinese control in 1997, while
Macao, a Portuguese colony since 1557, will not be returned until 1999.
322. Illustrative of this is a statement by DPP presidential candidate, Peng Ming-
Min: "'Chinese' to me is an ethnic description.... If people ask me [what my nation-
ality is], I answer I am a Taiwanese of Han Chinese descent. I am not anti-Chinese. I
am also proud of my Han culture and heritage." Professor Peng Ming-min Speaks
Out, Taiwan Communiqu6, Feb. 1993, at 17. Peng was selected as the DPP candidate
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as a model for mainland China, and perhaps even technocratic
Singapore. 3
The example of a healthy constitutional system contrasts with the
quirky constitutionalism of the People's Republic of China. The most
recent PRC constitutional permutation appeared in 1993, following
the previous constitutions of 1954, 1975, and 1982. Frank Ching, the
astute commentator for the Far Eastern Economic Review, has ob-
served that "China's constitution, unlike such documents in the West,
is akin to a political platform .... This is why it has to be amended, or
replaced wholesale, every time the Chinese Communist Party changes
its policy. China still does not have a constitution in the Western
sense of the word."324
How then may a Western student of Sun's theories of government
best adapt a framework by which to understand the constitutionalism
proposed for republican China? Edwin A. Winckler, a Research As-
sociate at Columbia University's East Asian Institute, participated in
a forum entitled "Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Re-
public of China" sponsored by the Institute's Taiwan Area Studies
Program.32 In his remarks, he offers a useful conceptual framework,
positing that the Western tradition contains three vastly different con-
ceptions of constitutionalism: conservative, radical, and liberal.32 6
The conservative constitution he distills as "Aristotelian"-"the
constitution of a country is 'what constitutes' the country, a summary
that 'conserves' its historical and social essence."'317 The radical con-
stitution, on the other hand, "prescribes how to abolish an undesirable
historically-inherited political system and how to construct an ideal
modem political one. '' 31 Wmckler defines the liberal constitution as
Madisonian, deploying "checks and balances to occupy the feasible
middle ground between the historically real and the politically
ideal."329
as the result of a party primary that allowed DPP members to vote for their choice.
See Peng Defeats Hsu in DPP Race, China News, Sept. 25, 1995, at 2.
323. While Singapore under the tutelage of Lee Kuan-yew has evolved into a pros-
perous city-state, the government remains thin-skinned about criticism. See, e.g.,
Drawing Lines: Singapore Cites Professor for Contempt, Far E. Econ. Rev., Feb. 2,
1995, at 5 (criticizing a Singapore court for holding author Christopher Lingle and the
International Herald Tribune in contempt for implying that Singapore's judiciary is
not above political decision making). For an elaboration of Lee Kuan Yew's philoso-
phy of guided political development, see Zakaria, supra note 24, at 109-26.
324. Frank Ching, Chinese Party Zig-Zags Spur Constitutional Changes, Far E.
Econ. Rev., Apr. 1, 1993, at 29.
325. Proceedings of the conference, held from October 16-17, 1990, are recorded in
Constitutional Reform, supra note 87.
326. Id. at 12-13.
327. Id. at 13.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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Winckler concludes that the drafters of the 1947 constitution had in
mind a radical model,33 and that "Taiwan is groping" toward a liberal
one.3 31 Such an analysis discounts the very conservative elements im-
plicit in Chinese republican constitutionalism-conservative in the
Aristotelian, or rather Burkean and Confucian, sense.
Edmund Burke was no hidebound conservative seeking to mum-
mify institutions simply because they had existed since time immemo-
rial. Yet he objected most strongly to the French Revolution, and its
bloodthirsty assault on all who remained from the old order. The
1949 revolution in China most closely resembled the French Revolu-
tion to which Burke objected.332 Sun's republican revolution was
rather like England's Glorious Revolution of 1688, a revolt against
tyranny as well as a revolution to restore ancient liberties. In Burke's
memorable prose,
The speculative line of demarcation, where obedience ought to end,
and resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and not easily defina-
ble .... The wise will determine from the gravity of the case; the
irritable from sensibility to oppression; the high-minded from dis-
dain and indignation at abusive power in unworthy hands; the brave
and bold from the love of honourable danger in a generous cause:
but, with or without right, a revolution will be the very last resource
of the thinking and the good....
... The Revolution was made to preserve our antient indisputable
laws and liberties, and that antient constitution of government which
is our only security for law and liberty.... We wished at the period
of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all we possess as an
inheritance from our forefathers.333
In a like manner, Sun Yat-sen's revolution, in addition to the constitu-
tion it gave rise to, can be appreciated anew if one looks at it as a
restorative revolution from the context of the Chinese political
tradition.
In referring to Yao and Shun,3 4 Sun appealed to a Chinese tradi-
tion of democratic sovereignty that was already ancient when Mencius
made reference to it. True, centuries of tyranny had obscured this tra-
dition, yet the ultimate sovereignty of the people was a notion implicit
in the Chinese idea of the state. As the early republican constitution-
alist theorist Dr. Min-ch'ien T.Z. Tyau observed:
330. "It was the hope of twentieth-century Chinese constitutionalists, particularly
those who favored parliamentarism, during the drafting of the 1947 Chinese constitu-
tion, and during the current attempt on Taiwan to revive it [to overcome traditional-
ism, imperialism and authoritarianism]." Id.
331. Id.
332. That is, as contained in Reflections on the Revolution in France. Burke, supra
note 259.
333. Id. at 42-43.
334. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
1250 [Vol. 64
1995] CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON TAIWAN
[In the Confucian classics] we have in embryo the fundamentals of a
limited monarchy, although the details remain to be worked out.
From a limited monarchy to a republic is not a far cry, and therefore
the change from autocracy to democracy requires no violent
wrenching from old traditions. Grounded on such political concep-
tions, the people are ripe for a greater measure of liberalism than is
vouchsafed in a limited monarchy. To admit the people as the co-
equal of the ruler is but a preliminary to the recognition that the
people, and not the ruler, is the sovereign of the country. So when
the new ideas of government and administration based on a written
constitution came along, they fell on good, fertile ground ... .33
Although it would not be until eighty years into the republican era
that the promise of "the new ideas of government" would truly begin
to bear fruit, Dr. Tyau was precisely on the mark when he stated that
the seeds of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism fell onto
"good, fertile ground."336
CONCLUSION
This Note has interpreted the ongoing constitutional reform of the
Republic of China on Taiwan of the 1990s by acknowledging the often
neglected contribution that the Confucian political tradition of popu-
lar sovereignty had on the Republic's founder, Sun Yat-sen. While
influences that are obviously derived from the West affected Sun's
ideology, a perspective that attempts to understand Taiwan's democ-
ratization from within the framework of the Chinese political tradition
can act as a corrective to those views that have seen the Chinese tradi-
tion as solely despotic.
335. Tyau, supra note 125, at 6.
336. Id.
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